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Abstract 
This thesis investigates how the social movement Invisible Children frames meaning for action in 
its Kony2012 campaign, how we can understand such framing of meaning for action as knowledge, 
and whether Invisible Children is responsible for the implications of such framings. The thesis 
integrates the subjects of International Development Studies and Philosophy and will integrate 
theoretical aspects and discussions from both subjects.  
Invisible Children is a US-based social movement that aims to remedy the situation for Ugandan 
children affected by atrocities committed by the rebel group the Lord Resistance Army and its 
leader Joseph Kony. Invisible Children is an interesting case as it has been extremely successful in 
motivating young Americans to engage in the campaign by framing meaning for action through a 
simple storyline with a clear, powerful message and an easy solution. 
Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action is analysed through Snow and Benford’s (2000) 
theory of collective action frames’ three components: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
framing. These framing components show: 1) Invisible Children is assigning blame and 
responsibility for the Ugandans’ suffering to Kony and taking the responsibility to remedy the 
Ugandans’ suffering. 2) It is targeting preselected celebrities and policymakers to spread the 
campaign and leverage the US government to make a military intervention to stop Kony. And 3) 
Invisible Children uses symbolic values of universalism and benevolence to motivate its members 
to act on its behalf.  
I question whether we can understand the framing of meaning for action as knowledge through 
Nancy Daukas (2006) by analysing whether we can assign trust to Invisible Children’s assessment 
of the Ugandan history and thereby understand it as knowledge. The findings show that Invisible 
Children is too self-confident in its epistemic character which keeps it from making the necessary 
epistemic investigations to be trustworthy in its assessments.  
I discuss whether Invisible Children is outcome, remedial and epistemically responsible for the 
implications of such framings through David Miller (2007) and Lorraine Code (1987). I find that 
Invisible Children is epistemic irresponsible in its assessments of northern Ugandan history. It is 
outcome responsible for its framing of meaning for action as it could have foreseen the 
implications of its actions and epistemic beliefs. Invisible Children is right in taking on the 
responsibility to remedy the situation for the northern Ugandans, but it is not behaving responsibly 
in its effort because it does not give agency to the Ugandans in its campaigning. The thesis 
concludes that Invisible Children is morally culpable in its framing of meaning for action in the 
Kony2012 campaign as its framing produced more harm than good for the northern Ugandans.  
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1. Introduction 
The thesis focuses on how the social movement Invisible Children frames information to make 
meaning for action in its Kony2012 campaign, and whether we can understand such meaning 
making as knowledge. Invisible Children is a US-based social movement dedicated to help the 
Ugandan children affected by the atrocities committed by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) an 
Ugandan rebel group. Invisible Children built its Kony2012 campaign upon a form of documentary 
storytelling about the Ugandan war and its effects on the children. Its aim is to end “the longest-
running war in Africa” and bring a permanent end to the LRA atrocities in the region. 
Invisible Children is an interesting case, as it has been extremely successful in framing the 
information in the Kony2012 campaign to make meaning for action, and motivating young people 
to act on its behalf. The campaign portrays the war in Uganda through a simple storyline with a 
clear, powerful message and an easy solution to end it. It is therefore interesting to investigate how 
Invisible Children has been so successful in motivating its members, and framing meaning for 
action, and whether we can understand such framing of meaning for action as knowledge.  
The thesis is integrated between the subjects of International Development Studies and 
Philosophy, and will integrate theoretical aspects and discussions from both subjects. Much 
International Development Studies literature surrounding social movements describes how such 
entities create meaning for action. Examples of this include: “collective contentious politics” 
(Tarrow 2011), “collective actions frames” (Benford&Snow 2000, 1992), “frames of protest” 
(Noakes&Johnston 2005) “transnational advocacy networks” (Keck&Sikkink 1998). Newer 
literature explicit focus on how social movements create meaning for action through the use of 
Internet: “Cyberprotest” (de Donk et all 2004) and “Cyberactivism” (McCaughey&Ayers 2003). 
Additionally researchers have argued that we should respect social movements as meaning makers 
who produce knowledge and new understandings of specific issues (Casas-Cortès, et al 2008, 
Kurzman 2008). 
Thus such literature is important as it can be used to analyse how Invisible Children creates 
meaning for action, however, while it is a useful analytical tool, it is not critical and does not 
question which implications such framing of meaning for action creates. Philosophical theory of 
epistemology can help us here. Through philosophical literature on epistemology I can discuss 
whether Invisible Children’s framing of meaning of action actually is knowledge and which 
epistemic implications such framing has. In conducting such a discussion I am respecting Invisible 
Children as potential knowledge makers, and investigation how we can understand its framing of 
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information as knowledge. Additionally the interaction with real world examples challenges 
epistemological theory to interact with complicated cases in which we can test whether we can use 
such theoretical frameworks to explain how we interact in everyday meaning making. Thus the 
theory of social movements, from the subject of International Development, and the philosophical 
theory of epistemology strengthen each other which enables me to make a grounded analysis of 
whether we can understand the information framing in the Kony2012 campaign as knowledge. 
However, before going deeper into this discussion I will present a historic overview of the history of 
Uganda which aim is to show the historical context on which the Kony2012 campaign is engaging.  
1.1 The Ugandan political history 
Uganda gained independence on 9 October 1962. The first election was held on 1 March 1961, and 
Benedicto Kiwanuka of the Democratic Party became the first prime minister. Since its 
independence, Uganda has suffered from continuous cycles of armed conflicts between the 
different governments and rebellions trying to overthrow them. In particular, the rebel group Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) with their spiritual leader, Joseph Kony, revolted against President Yoweri 
Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA), due to the government’s political exclusion of 
his northern ethnic group, the Acholi population (Branch 2010).  
The LRA arose as a response to two political crises in Acholi society. These crises were embedded 
in the political history of Uganda, where ethnic politics had a central role. When the NRA took 
power in 1986, it led to both an internal and national crisis for the Acholi population. The internal 
crisis appeared as a consequence of a breakdown of authority internally in Acholi society. The 
external, national crisis was brought about by the destruction of Acholi representation in Uganda’s 
national political society (Branch 2010:25). Each post-1986 Acholi rebel group, the UNDP, the 
Holy Spirit Movement, and the LRA appeared as a response to these crises, and each tried to create 
internal order in Acholi society by building a resistance against the external enemy, the NRA.  
During Milton Obote first presidency (1966 to 1971), he brought significant numbers of northern 
Ugandans into the central state, both through the civil service and the military. This created a 
north-south cleavage in national politics which eventually provided the basis for a southern 
political identity that was central to the NRA rebellion. Idi Amin, with his coup in 1971, declared an 
end to ethnic favouritism towards the northerners and purged the military and the national civil 
service of northern political elites. When Obote returned to the presidency in 1980, he reinstated 
Acholi and Langi people in the military but otherwise created no political rehabilitation of the 
Acholi middle class (Branch 2010:28-30).   
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The NRA emerged as a rebellion against what the southerners saw as a northern military 
dictatorship. The Acholi population ended up bearing the brunt of the anti-northern sentiment 
because of their disproportionately large presence in the armed forces. In 1986, the NRA took 
Kampala and sent the remaining Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) troops fleeing north 
(Branch 2010:31). The Acholi elders saw the flood of thousands of undisciplined armed young 
Acholi men as a significant threat to their authority, thus the Acholi population’s fragile internal 
order was thrown into crisis. When the NRA soldiers arrived in Acholiland, they fundamentally 
misinterpreted the situation. They saw their enemy in ethnic terms and the Acholi as the 
consummate northern tribe and presumed that there automatically would be a bond between the 
rural Acholi population and the UNLA. Even after easily occupying Acholiland, the NRA continued 
treating it as enemy territory. Politically, this meant that the NRA excluded the Acholi population 
from national power, undermining the possibility of re-establishing legitimate state authority 
(Branch 2010:33). Even though Museveni claimed that there was complete peace in Acholiland 
from March 1986 onwards, organisations like Amnesty International reported abuse and human 
rights violations, and by August 1986, it became evident that the Acholi population was subject to a 
violent military occupation by their own state (Branch 2010:34).  
The rebel groups 
As a response to the violence against the Acholi population, several ex-UNLA reorganised as a rebel 
group, the UPDA. Faced with a common enemy, the Acholi elders and the UPDA were able to come 
together and stabilize the internal order around a shared Acholi identity (Branch 2010:34). The 
UPDA was soon able to gain significant support among the civilian population, and in August 1986, 
it attacked the Gulu district and had the intention of using it as a base to retake Kampala. The NRA 
counter-insurgency was so brutal that the UPDA was no longer able to provide the adequate 
protection to the population. The UPDA held together until the beginning of 1987 when it began to 
splinter (Branch 2010:35). As the UPDA failed to resolve the external national crisis, the internal 
crisis erupted again, and a new rebel group emerged to try to assert legitimate authority over the 
population (Branch 2010:36).  
The new rebel group was led by the female Acholi spiritual medium, Alice Auma, known as 
Lakwena or ‘Messenger’. Like the UPDA, Lakwena attempted to resolve the internal crisis by 
asserting her legitimate authority over the Acholi society and rallying the people against a common 
enemy, the NRA. Lakwena began mobilizing through a discourse of spiritual cleansing within 
Acholiland. She drew on a long-standing alternative tradition of Acholi spirituality that contested 
the claims to authority of the Acholi elders (Branch 2010:36). Lakwena claimed to be able to 
cleanse the impure in the Acholi population, re-establish internal order, and combat the NRA. In 
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July 1987, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) began moving east and south. The HSM was able to 
find regional support and recruited heavily in areas where the NRA’s arrival had been interpreted 
as an occupation rather than liberation. But as the HSM crossed into Bantu area, just a few dozen 
kilometres from Kampala, the movement was seen as an invading northern army, and within a 
couple of weeks the HSM had disintegrated (Branch 2010:37).  
After Lakwena left Acholiland, the fractions of the HSM and UPDA terrorised each other’s 
suspected civilian supporters. It was from this environment that Joseph Kony and his Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) emerged. Although Kony was able to gain some support, he was generally 
confronted with a population unwilling to support continued violence. As a result, Kony had to rely 
on increased violence against civilians for his group’s material and social survival (Branch 
2010:38). Like Lakwena, Kony proposed cleansing of an internal enemy, but in Kony’s conception, 
it was the political corruption of the administrative apparatus of the NRA embodied in the Acholi 
society that needed to be cleansed (Branch 2010:40). Kony understood Acholi identity as being 
LRA supporter, and thereby framed a difference between supporters of the government and 
genuine Acholi identity. He dismissed the power of the elders or any other authority to determine 
the bounds of the Acholi identity and claimed that it was only the LRA who would make this 
division in the Acholi community. Thus what might have appeared from LRA’s perspective to be a 
reasonable purifying strategy, appeared from the Acholi civilians’ perspective, to be an 
unpredictable, vicious reign of violence. The LRA’s ideas of who represented the impure Acholi 
were constantly in flux and had little to do with what the civilians understood to be government 
collaborators. This further entrenched the political crisis (Branch 2010:42). The LRA also became 
associated with forced recruitments or abductions, often of children, and over the years thousand 
were incorporated into the movement in this way. Additionally, some were forced to perform 
atrocities such as mutilating or killing relatives as part of their initiation (Allen&Vlassenroot 
2010:11).  
The Ugandan government’s response to the LRA violence has shifted back and forth between peace 
negotiations and military offensives. A four-month military operation “Operation North” was 
mounted in 1991, but the LRA counter-insurgency was even more violent, and hundreds of people 
were maimed or killed. In 1994, Betty Bigombe, the Minister of State for Pacification of Northern 
Uganda, managed to engage the LRA in peace talks by walking into the bush without protection. 
Over the course of four meetings with Kony, she arranged an uneasy ceasefire, and it looked as 
though there was the prospect of a peace agreement. However, President Museveni was not very 
enthusiastic, and in February 1994, he issued an ultimatum to the LRA that collapsed the 
negotiations and the killings resumed (Allen&Vlassenroot 2010:11). Museveni claimed that he had 
received military intelligence showing that the LRA were only involved in the peace negotiations to 
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rebuild their military capacity. According to Allen and Vlassenroot (2012), this might have been 
true, but the war in northern Uganda also had certain political advantages for Museveni; keeping 
his power, and justifying his huge military budget. Additionally, the horrific violence and weird 
spirituality of the LRA allowed the government to portray the north as a barbaric periphery 
(Allen&Vlassenroot 2010:12). The government’s military insurgency operations continued with 
operation Iron Fist in 2002 and Operation Lightning Thunder in December 2008. Another peace 
negotiation was initiated in Juba in 2006 to 2008, but collapsed late November 2008. The LRA left 
Uganda in 2006 and is now operating in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the 
Central African Republic. 
In 2003, Museveni was persuaded to refer the situation to the newly established International 
Criminal Court (ICC). It was the ICC’s first big case, and it spurred the debate on how the ICC was 
going to handle the allegations of serious crimes carried out by Ugandans government and the LRA 
(Allen&Vlassenroot 2010:16). It was at that time that the founders of Invisible Children, Jason 
Russell, Laren Poole and Bobby Bailey were first confronted with the war in Uganda by stumbling 
upon the night commuters in Gulu in their travels from South Sudan. This meeting was the 
beginning of Invisible Children and their fight to make the children of northern Uganda visible. 
1.2 Research area 
Invisible Children’s aim is to support the children affected by LRA atrocities by raising awareness 
to, and advocating their cause. Since 2005, Invisible Children has hosted 13,809 film screenings 
and held 7 international events and campaigns to propagate its media, raise awareness, and 
generate funds (InvisibleChildren/nationaltour 2013)1. Invisible Children has been extremely 
successful in motivating young Americans to engage in this global social issue. Since its inception 
in 2003, Invisible Children has mobilized tens of thousands of young people, mainly in North 
America, and has raised tens of millions of dollars (Finnegan 2011:5). Invisible Children distributes 
its films, creates awareness and raises funds through groups of young members who host local 
events, share Invisible Children’s film, and participate in awareness raising campaigns and 
advocacy events.  
Looking closer at Invisible Children, then, how can we understand its success in motivating so 
many young people to participate in its advocacy? And how are Invisible Children creating 
awareness and advocacy? 
Invisible Children launched the Kony2012 campaign in March 2012, releasing the 30 minutes long 
Kony2012 film on YouTube and Vimeo on 5 March 2012. The film spread instantly and quickly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 http://invisiblechildren.com/program/national-tour/ d.05.11.2013 
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became one of the most viewed films in history with more than 100 million views in just a week, 
and it created unprecedented amounts of attention in just a few days. The video describes how 
Kony and his rebel group the LRA have been abducting children in Uganda for the past 26 years. 
The campaign’s purpose was to raise global awareness about Kony by making him famous, and 
thereby bringing him to justice before the end of 2012 (Invisible Children 2012)2.  
Immediately following the release and success, the campaign received heavy criticism: Critics 
accused the young members of engaging in slacktivism3, only practicing easy meaningless form of 
“social action”. Critics also argued that the military intervention Invisible Children is advocating 
for as the solution to stop Kony, will have serious consequences for the northern Ugandans. It has 
been criticised for irresponsible use of economic resources, as it spend less than a third of the 
money it has raised directly on the Ugandan development programmes. Lastly critics have stated 
that Invisible Children is oversimplifying the conflict, framing it as ahistorical, and that it gives no 
agency to the Ugandans and the local organisations working in the area. 
1.2.1 Meaning-making 
As showed in the introduction, Invisible Children has been successful in framing meaning making 
for action in its Kony2012 campaign. According to Keck and Sikkink we can understand this 
information framing as essential for social movements, as it binds them together. Social 
movements generate attention through creative use of media and information from alternative 
sources, providing not only facts, but also testimonies and personal stories from the people whose 
lives have been affected (Keck&Sikkink 1998:19).  
Framing meaning for action is recognised as an important facet of social movements, and social 
movements often construct frames of meaning to organize experiences and guide action through 
what is known as collective action frames. According to Snow and Benford (1992, 2000), collective 
action frames are understood as an interpretive function where social movements, such as Invisible 
Children, simplify and condense the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding 
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past 
environment with the intention of mobilizing potential members. Thus, collective action frames are 
action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimize the activities and 
campaigns of social movements (Benford&Snow 2000:614, 1992:137). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc d.05.11.2013 
3 The term slacktivism is derived from a fusion between slacker and activism, and is defined as: ”actions performed via 
the Internet in support of a political or social cause but regarded as requiring little time or involvement, e.g. signing an 
online petition or joining a campaign on a social media website.” 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/slacktivism d.03.11.2013 
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At the root of making meaning is the proposition that humans constantly seek to understand the 
world around them, and that the imposition of meaning on the world is a goal in itself. “Meaning 
includes understandings of right and wrong, cognitive understandings of true and false, perceptual 
understandings of like and unlike, social understanding of identity and difference etc.” (Kurzmann 
2008:5). Philosophically speaking, these are questions of epistemology and knowledge. 
Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. Epistemology is 
concerned with questions such as: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge? 
What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? Understood more broadly, 
epistemology is about the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry 
(Steup 2005:1). 
How does Invisible Children frame meaning for action? And can we assign trust and credibility to 
the framing of information in the Kony2012 campaign, and thereby understand it as knowledge?  
1.2.2 Responsibility 
Invisible Children calls attention to issues by using language that dramatizes and draws attention 
to its concerns. As the purpose of campaigning is persuading and stimulating people to act, social 
movements interpret facts and testimony, usually framing issues simply in terms of right and 
wrong (Keck&Sikkink 1998:19-20). The process in which the information is chosen normally 
involves several layers of prior translation and selection to fit the collective action frame and as a 
consequence such interpretations can sometimes lead to local informants losing control over their 
stories (Keck&Sikkink 1998:20).  
Invisible Children’s framing of information to call attention to the issue of northern Uganda, 
involves several layers of prior translation of personal testimonies and facts, which raise important 
questions of responsibility. Given the criticism of the lack of Ugandan agency and of the historic 
oversimplification, we can ask which implications this kind of framing of meaning for action have?  
According to David Miller (2007) we have a remedial responsibility to aid does in need, and we can 
understand Invisible Children’s Kony2012 campaign as trying to remedy the situation for the 
northern Ugandans by bringing justice to Kony. However, we also have a responsibility for the 
foreseeable outcomes of our actions and epistemic decisions, thus we would expect Invisible 
Children to have an outcome responsibility for the implications of its framing of meaning for 
action. But how can we understand this responsibility? And in which way can we hold Invisible 
Children responsible? 
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1.3 Main research question 
How can Invisible Children’s success in motivating young people, and in framing meaning for 
action be explained? How can this framing of meaning for action be understood as knowledge? And 
in which ways can Invisible Children be held responsible for the implications of such framing? 
1.3.1 Theoretical reflections 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis examines the Kony2012 campaign from the perspective of 
both International Development Studies and Philosophy. In this section I will reflect on the 
theoretical choices I have made within both subjects, and discuss how the two subjects theoretical 
frameworks can support each other in the analysis during the thesis, and how taken together the 
two subjects can answer the main research question.  
Theory from International Development Studies 
The choice of case is chosen from within the subject of International Development Studies, as this 
subject focus on a specific thematic within social science. I start the thesis by examine how 
Invisible Children motivates its members to action in Chapter 3. To make this examination I will 
analyse how Invisible Children creates collectives identities and shared emotions among its 
members, this within social movement theory. Specifically I have chosen to build this theoretical 
framework on Sidney Tarrow (2011) Power in movements. This analysis enables me to explain how 
Invisible Children has been so successful in motivating young people to act, and which form of 
activism and advocacy these members make possible. 
This naturally leads to an analysis of how Invisible Children frame meaning for action in the 
Kony2012 campaign in Chapter 4. Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action is closely 
linked to how Invisible Children frame information in the campaign to get its members to act. This 
analysis is done within the theory of collective actions frames, specifically Snow and Benford’s 
(1992, 2000) theory of collective action frames through the components: 1) diagnostic framing; 
assigning blame and responsibility, 2) prognostic framing; the proposed solutions, and 3) 
motivational frame; call to action. The analysis will also include a discussion of the key critiques 
relevant for this thesis; the oversimplification of the history of Uganda, and the missing Ugandan 
agency.  
These two analyses are primarily done within the subject of International Development Studies, 
however, they raise interesting philosophical questions of knowledge and responsibility.  
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Theory from Philosophy  
Through the analysis of how Invisible Children frames meaning for action in the Kony2012 
campaign, and what implications such framing brings we can question whether and how such 
framing can be understood as knowledge, this is done in Chapter 5.  
To analyse whether and how we can understand the framing of meaning for action as knowledge, I 
analyse whether we can understand Invisible Children as epistemic trustworthy agents, this 
through Nancy Daukas (2006) Epistemic Trust and Social Location. The argument is that if we can 
assign trust to Invisible Children’s epistemic assessments in the Kony2012 campaign, we can 
understand this information as knowledge, or at least as justified beliefs. Additionally, through 
Miranda Fricker’s (2011) Epistemic injustice, I discuss whether the missing voice of the northern 
Ugandan in the Kony2012 campaign is an expression of epistemic injustice towards the northern 
Ugandans. 
The analysis is mainly done within the philosophical framework of feministic virtue epistemology. 
However, the analysis is conducted by relying on the findings from the previous chapters, and will 
expand the understanding of how social movements framing of meaning for action is 
understandable as knowledge, and which implications such framings brings.  
Integration of the theories  
In chapter 3, 4 and 5, I have analysed and discussed how Invisible Children frame meaning for 
action in its Kony2012 campaign, which implications this framing bring, and how we can 
understand this framing as knowledge. The thesis final discussion, Chapter 6, discusses in which 
way we can hold Invisible Children responsible for the implications its framing of meaning of 
action has for the northern Ugandans. The theoretical framework built upon philosophical theory 
of responsibility, specifically through David Miller (2007) National responsibility and Global 
Justice and Lorraine Code (1987) Epistemic responsibility, however, the theoretical framework is 
an integration of all the previous findings and theories. 
In section 1.2.2 I argued, through David Miller, that we have a remedial responsibility to help does 
in need, thus Invisible Children is aiming to fulfil its remedial responsibility by remedying the 
situation for the northern Ugandans. This remedial responsibility is closely linked with Invisible 
Children’s members’ shared emotions, analysed in Chapter 3, and the collective action frame’s 
diagnostic and motivational framing, analysed in Chapter 4. Thus we can understands Invisible 
Children’s punctuating of specific shared emotions and motivational values as aiming at getting its 
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members to feel a remedial responsibility to aid the Ugandans. This is underlined with how 
Invisible Children assign blame and responsibility in its diagnostic framing.  
In addition to remedial responsibility, we also have a responsibility for the foreseeable outcome of 
our actions. I link this outcome responsibility with epistemic responsibility in that I argue that we 
have an outcome responsibility for the foreseeable outcome of both our actions and our epistemic 
decisions. This is mainly discussed based on Invisible Children’s epistemic character, and 
stereotypical understanding found in Chapter 5. 
Lastly I discuss whether Invisible Children is morally to blame for its framing of meaning for action 
by evaluating whether Invisible Children is preventing more harm than good in its framing of 
meaning for action in the Kony2012. In this discussion I integrate the findings from Chapter 4 and 
5, and relate it to general International Development literature on development campaigns. 
The discussions in Chapter 6 integrate both International Development Studies and Philosophical 
theories into an overall frame on which I can discuss whether Invisible Children is epistemic, 
outcome and remedial responsible for the implications of its framing of meaning for action.  
1.3.2 Composition of the thesis 
In this section I will give a short description of the composition of the thesis. This is done to give an 
overview of each chapter, to highlight the thread of consistency, and show how I answer the main 
research question.  
1. The Introduction serves to introduce the focus and aim of this thesis by introducing the 
research area and the main research question. 2. The Methods seek to explain and reflect on the 
methodological choices taken in the thesis. Chapter 3. Invisible Children serves as an 
explanatory chapter to make the foundation to answer the first part of the first question in the 
main research question: How can Invisible Children’ success in motivating young people be 
explained? The chapter give a rich introduction to Invisible Children, analysed through social 
movement theory. Chapter 4. Kony2012 analyse how Invisible Children frame meaning for action 
in the Kony2102 which will answer the second part of main research question’s first question: How 
can Invisible Children’s framing meaning for action be explained? Simultaneous with this analysis 
I will discuss the framing’s implications, through which we will reach a more profound 
understanding these. This will engender questions of epistemology and responsibility. Chapter 5. 
Epistemology discusses the main research question’s second question, ‘How can the framing of 
information in be understood as knowledge? The question is analysed by discussion whether we 
can assign trust to Invisible Children as an epistemic agent. The analysis will also bring us to a 
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discussion of the framings implications, and an understanding of the missing Ugandan agency in 
the campaign. Chapter 6. Responsibility will discuss the main research question’s last question: 
In which way can Invisible Children be held responsible for the implication of such framings? 
This discussion serves to bring the analysis to a more general level, by discussion how Invisible 
Children can be held outcome, remedial and epistemic responsible for the implications of the 
framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign. 7. The Conclusion will compile the 
conclusions from the other chapters and thereby answer the main research question.
2. Methods 
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2. Methods 
This chapter seeks to explain and reflect on my methodological choices throughout the thesis. I will 
argue for the choice of case, the validity of the thesis as a case study, my theoretical and empirical 
choices, and the delimitations I have made. First, I will explain my personal interest, 
preconceptions and assumptions that may have affected the approach to the analysis.   
2.1 Personal interest, preconceptions and assumptions 
When I first watched the Kony2012 video, I was left with a feeling of ambivalence - I was very 
moved watching the film, both hearing and seeing the terrible pictures and being introduced to a 
conflict I did not know much about. I found the film very effective in making me feel that I had an 
obligation to help the war-affected population of Uganda. However, I could not help feeling a kind 
of disgust of the methods Invisible Children used in their storytelling; the general pictures, the 
simple historical information, and the storytellers showing themselves as centre of the story. As a 
student of International Development and Philosophy, I naturally had some preconceptions and 
assumptions of the implications that the film might bring. First of all, I knew that the conflict in 
Uganda was more complex than the storyline of the film showed. Second, I had an idea of the 
ethical and epistemic implications of framing meaning for action. Third, I had an expectation of the 
high level of responsibility one needs to have in conducting awareness campaigns on behalf of 
others who have relatively less power.  
Nonetheless, I was fascinated by Invisible Children’s ability to motivate so many young people and 
being so loud in its awareness campaigns. I wanted to give Invisible Children the benefit of the 
doubt by respecting it as a meaning maker for action, and make an investigation of it without 
letting my negative preconceptions influence the analysis.  
2.2 Case  
In this section, I will discuss the justifications of the choice of case. Additionally, I will describe and 
argue the validly of this thesis case study of Invisible Children and its Kony2012 campaign. 
My fascination and ambivalence with the Invisible Children and the Kony2012 campaign was the 
first reason for taking interest in this exact case. Additionally, the Kony2012 campaign is chosen on 
the grounds of its new, innovative way of campaigning, which has proved to be very successful. 
With the increasing use of social media, I think we will see much more of such campaigning in the 
future. As an example, Action Aid Denmark advocated in its Taxpower campaign its members to 
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make a media-storm on Facebook on 21 October 2013. Like Invisible Children, it wanted its 
members to share a film on Facebook, however, only at a specific time.  
The case of Invisible Children is not chosen to discuss these social platforms’ communicative 
influence but to discuss how social movements can frame meaning for action on such platforms, 
whether such framing is understandable as knowledge, and in which ways a social movement like 
Invisible Children can be held responsible for the implication of such framings. Invisible Children 
is an interesting case because of the tension between being so successful in its Kony2012 advocacy 
campaign, and in motivating so many young people to act, while simultaneously receiving such 
heavy criticism for its methods of framing meaning for action.  
I have chosen to conduct a case study because social movements constitute fast-moving, changing 
targets (Dahlgren 2004:xvi), where the information assessed and analysed is contemporary and 
changes with the social movement’s evolvement. I will give detailed introductions to both Invisible 
Children and the Kony2012 campaign in chapter 3 and 4, which is why I do not discuss them 
further here. 
2.2.1 Validity 
In this section, I discuss the validity of my choice of case in relation to the thesis’ empirical and 
theoretical foundation. I use Robert Yin’s (1989) four criteria for assessing the quality and validity 
of the case study: 1) Constructed validity, 2) Internal validity, 3) External validity, and 4) Reliability 
(Yin 1989:40-41).  
To ensure the constructed validity of the thesis, I use multiple sources of empirical data to justify 
my empirical assumptions. First and foremost, I use Invisible Children’s own website which 
contains blog posts, statements, facts about the movement’s work, and all its films. Subsequently, I 
rely on Finnegan’s empirical findings in the fieldwork for her dissertation. I compare this 
information with other articles and investigations focused on Invisible Children and the Kony2012 
campaign. This establishes a chain of evidence where I compare the different empirical findings 
and hold it together with relevant explanatory theories.  
To insure internal validity, I give rich explanations of the history of Invisible Children, the 
Kony2012 campaign, and the critiques towards it. When rival evidence or arguments occur, I 
demonstrate them. However, as the thesis focuses on Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for 
action within the Kony2012 campaign, I will limit my focus to only include aspects relevant to this 
case. The constructed and internal validity also serve to ensure reliability in the thesis. The chain 
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of evidences insures that the empirical information is valid, and internal validity insures that the 
reader can follow my analytical steps.  
According to Yin, ensuring external validity has been a major barrier for case studies as critics 
have stated that single cases offer a poor basis for generalizing (Yin 1988:43). However, it is not the 
intent of this thesis to generalise the findings of the investigations of Invisible Children and the 
Kony2012 campaign. Social movement theory and studies function within the contemporary study 
where social movements evolve, take interest in different issues, and use different tactics in their 
framing of meaning for action, thus no specific case study on a social movement’s campaign is 
written in generalising terms. Likewise, one will not find concrete overall conclusions or checklists 
for making good development campaigns in this thesis. However, I use different normative theory 
of moral responsibility and epistemology throughout the investigation, thus even though the thesis’ 
findings are context specific, I will argue that the conclusion could serve as useful inspiration for 
others working with campaigning on development issues.  
The following section will include a more detailed discussion of the choice of empirical data, theory 
and the delimitations which also serve to ensure the validity and reliability in the thesis.  
2.3 Choice of empirical data 
In this section I will explain my choices of empirical data. Most of Invisible Children’s advocacy on 
the Kony2012 campaign, and the criticism towards it has taken place on social media platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter and on personal blogs. Most of the thesis’ empirical data is found through 
these new communication platforms, thus the empirical work in the thesis is based on an 
investigation of the nature of the debate on these platforms which has required making an 
overview of the debating blogs. This work entails comparing the opinions to one another, and 
creating a general picture of the critiques towards Kony2012 and the responses from Invisible 
Children.  
The thesis’ primary empirical data is Invisible Children’s media and website which contains blog 
posts, statements, and facts about the movement’s work as well as all its films. Invisible Children 
uses film and media as its main communication outlet, where it makes presentations of the 
movement, its campaigns and events. Additionally, Invisible Children answers to critique and 
make general statements through its films, thus discussing Invisible Children’s advocacy and 
response to critiques is done by analysing its films and media. This is mainly presented in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4.	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The thesis’ secondary empirical data mostly rely on blogs from respected academics focussing on 
development problematics in east and central Africa such as Alex de Waal, Mahmood Mandani, 
and Sverker Finnström. I believe that they have the fundamental empirical and theoretical 
understanding to analyse and discuss Invisible Children’s advocacy. Additional blog posts have 
been used to ensure an expanded view and overall representation of the debate concerning 
Invisible Children’s advocacy. This work is mostly presented in Chapter 4 where I discuss the 
critiques and implications of the framing of meaning for action. This discussion will be central to 
the epistemic analysis in Chapter 5 and the discussion of responsibility in Chapter 6. To elaborate 
and expand on this empirical data, I have drawn on Amy Finnegan’s (2011) dissertation Beyond 
Victimhood: Narratives of Social Change from and for Northern Uganda. Finnegan’s work has a 
central role in analysing the members’ collective identity and feelings in Chapter 3 and the 
northern Ugandan activists’ opinion of Invisible Children in Chapter 4.   
2.4 Choice of theory 
In this section, I will explain and argue for the theoretical choices I have made in the thesis in 
relation to other theoretical aspects on the area. Generally, I have focused my theoretical choices so 
they interact with the thesis’ empirical literature either explaining or contesting it. 
2.4.1 Theory from International Development Studies 
As stated in the introduction Chapter 3 and 4 are mainly conducted within the subject of 
International Development Studies, where I analyse Invisible Children’s: 1) collective identity and 
shared emotions through social movement theory, and 2) collective action frame through which it 
frame meaning for action.   
To analyse Invisible Children’s collective identity and shared emotions in Chapter 3, I have used 
Sidney Tarrow (2011) Power in Movements. I have chosen to build my analysis primarily on 
Tarrow because she is a leading expert within social movement theory and contentious politics. 
Tarrow focuses her work both on the internal and external components where the internal focus on 
construction of collective identity and feelings, and the externally focus on contemporary 
contentious protest through campaigning and on protests which take different forms. Additionally, 
Tarrow includes thoughts from other leading social movements’ theorists such as Snow and 
Benford on whom the analysis in Chapter 4 is focused thus bringing coherence between the 
theoretical frameworks.  
To analyse Invisible Children’s collective action frame in Chapter 4, I have chosen to focus on Snow 
and Benford’s (1992, 2000) work on the subject, as they have been the most influential among 
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American scholars which is why most literature on collective action frames builds on their work 
(Mueller 1992:13). I use Snow and Benford’s theoretical concept of “core framing tasks”: 
diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing as the main structure to analyse how Invisible 
Children frames meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign. Within each component, I draw on 
additional theory to elaborate and expand the analysis.  
In diagnostic framing, I include on Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Transnational Advocacy Network to 
illustrate how Invisible Children frame information. Keck and Sikkink define transnational 
advocacy networks as, “organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often 
involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to rationalist 
understanding of their “interests”” (Keck&Sikkink 1998:8-9). Even though one can make a valid 
argument for analysing Invisible Children as a transnational advocacy network, I am not interested 
in conducting this analysis. Though interesting, I do not find it relevant for answering the thesis’ 
main research question. The theory is therefore only used to analyse Invisible Children’s framing of 
information as a tactic to frame meaning for action. 
In motivational framing, I draw on Holmes et al’s (2011) and Darnton and Kirk’s (2011) 
Motivational Value System to analyse which values Invisible Children propagates to motivate its 
members to action. This framework is based upon Swartz’s values circumplex which is comprised 
of ten value types. According to Darnton and Kirk, how our social life is framed has particular 
influence on the balance of values we hold (Darnton&Kirk 2011:41). Social movements frame their 
campaign through specific values which generate specific attitudes towards development 
campaigns. According to Darnton and Kirk, the values have dynamic interrelations, where 
compatible values appear adjacent, and conflicting values 
appear opposite to one another. If the values do not 
correlate, they appear orthogonally to one another at right 
angels (Darnton&Kirk 2011:42). However, because I find 
this argumentation for use of values in development 
campaigning somewhat problematic, I will not use this 
distinction in the analysis. The motivational value system is 
only used to analyse which values Invisible Children 
propagates to motivate its members to actions. 
Social movements are a ‘fuzzy’ and ‘fluid’ phenomena often without clear boundaries, as van de 
Donk et al (2004) describe it. Social movements may expand or shrink considerably over a short 
period of time and may quickly change their form, strategy, tactics, and even their goals, thus social 
movements are moving targets which make them difficult to observe (van de Donk et al 2004:3). 
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Most theory on social movement is therefore descriptive and explanatory focussing on how social 
movements frame meaning for action or create collective identities. The theories do not focus on 
which implications such framings bring or what kind of responsibility social movements have for 
these. However, philosophical theories of epistemology and responsibility can integrate these 
aspects in the analyses which enables me to discuss Invisible Children’s framing against normative 
ideals of responsibility and virtues of good epistemic behaviour.  
2.4.2 Theory from philosophy 
As stated in the introduction the analyses and discussion in Chapter 5 and 6 are conducted within a 
philosophical theoretical framework. The theories enables me to discuss whether Invisible 
Children’s framing of meaning for action is understandable as knowledge, and how we can hold 
Invisible Children responsible for the implications of its framing.  
To analyse whether Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action can be understood as 
knowledge, I draw on feminist virtue epistemological authors. These epistemological theorists 
focus on identifying ways in which dominant conceptions and practices of knowledge disadvantage 
oppressed groups. I find this angle interesting and relevant as I not only seek to understand 
whether the framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign is knowledge but also which 
epistemic implication such conception of knowledge may have on the northern Ugandans. Feminist 
virtue epistemology enables me to analyse these aspects. More specifically, I have chosen to focus 
on Nancy Daukas (2006) Epistemic Trust and Social Location and Miranda Fricker (2011) 
Epistemic Injustice. Through Daukas’ focus on trustworthiness, I analyse whether we can assign 
trust to Invisible Children epistemic assessments of the war in Uganda, and thereby analyse 
whether its framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign is knowledge. Through 
Fricker’s theoretical framework of unreliable stereotypical prejudice that can lead to epistemic 
injustice, I can analyse which stereotypical understandings Invisible Children holds towards the 
northern Ugandans. This analysis can explain the missing Ugandan agency in the campaign which 
is essential in understanding the implications of Invisible Children’s framing.  
To discuss whether and how we can hold Invisible Children responsible for its framing of meaning 
for action in Chapter 6, I use David Miller (2007) National Responsibility and Global Justice and 
Lorraine Code (1987) Epistemic Responsibility. Miller’s theory of responsibility is an attempt to 
theorize global justice. One of his main questions is what responsibility we have to aid the world’s 
poor. An interesting element, and the main part of my choice of the theory, is Miller’s focus on 
agency and responsibility. Miller complains that many theorists of global egalitarian distributive 
justice treat beneficiaries only as victims. According to Miller, an acceptable theory of 
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responsibility has to have the right balance between two aspects of the human condition: both 
regarding human beings as vulnerable and needy and as choosing responsible agents.  
Miller’s distinction enables me to analyse which implications Invisible Children’s framing of 
meaning for action have for the northern Ugandans. Additionally, it allows me to discuss what kind 
of responsibility Invisible Children takes upon itself when trying to remedy the situation in 
Uganda. I will integrate Lorraine Code’s (1987) theory of Epistemic Responsibility as an additional 
component of responsibility to discuss whether Invisible Children is epistemically responsible in its 
framing of information. This discussion functions to integrate the epistemic analysis of knowledge 
into the discussion of responsibility.  
2.4 Delimitations 
In this section, I will discuss the delimitations of the thesis by discussing which other aspects could 
have been interesting to integrate and why I have chosen not to. 
I have chosen not to conduct fieldwork or qualitative inquiries. This choice is based on the focus of 
my investigation and the scope of fieldwork had I chosen to conduct one. By focusing on “framing 
meaning for action”, it is essential to understand the nature of the debate about Invisible Children 
and its advocacy in the Kony2102 campaign. This debate has mainly been played out on social 
media platforms which is why I wanted to prioritise my focus on understanding of the nature of the 
debate on these platforms. Additionally, a potential fieldwork study would not have been feasible 
within this thesis’ timeframe, because getting an overall picture of the implications of Invisible 
Children’s framing, would include conducting fieldwork in northern Ugandan, interaction with 
people who have engaged with Invisible Children and/or seen the Kony2012 video, as well as with 
Invisible Children’s members in the US.  
In my analysis of Invisible Children as a social movement, I have chosen not to focus on the 
discussion of civil society, global civil society and the related discussion of state sovereignty. Even 
though this discussion would have been interesting and could have helped to explain how and why 
a social movement such as Invisible Children can push for power on the international stage, I will 
argue that this focus would have disrupted the thread of consistency in the thesis. This is also why I 
have chosen not to discuss Invisible Children as a transnational advocacy network, as this 
discussion is closely linked to the understanding of global civil society and state sovereignty.
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3. Invisible Children                    
In this chapter, I will analyse how Invisible Children create collective identity and shared emotions 
through Sidney Tarrow (2011) Power in Movements. This is done to answer the first part of the 
first question in the main research question: How can Invisible Children’s success in motivating 
young people be explained? 
First, I will present a historical overview of Invisible Children’s development, then I will present a 
theoretical framework of social movements, and lastly I will use this framework to analyse how 
Invisible Children motivates action by creating collective identities and shared emotions, and 
which form of activism this enables. 
3.1 The history of Invisible Children  
Invisible Children is a media-based, storytelling, non-profit organisation using the Internet’s social 
media platforms for political activism and raising awareness. It was registered in 2004, and its 
mission is “to use film, creativity, and social action to end the use of child soldiers in Joseph Kony’s 
rebel war and restore Northern Uganda to peace and prosperity” (Finnegan 2011:56, Swartz 
2012:1).  
In 2003, the co-founders, three young Americans, Jason Russell, Bobby Bailey, and Laren Poole, 
travelled by themselves to Africa in search for ‘their story’ about which to make a documentary. 
Travelling through Uganda, on their way back from Sudan, they stumbled upon the nightly 
commute of young children in Gulu, northern Uganda and thereby ‘discovered’ the LRA, and 
Joseph Kony. To this, the movie’s narrator Jason Russell states: “needless to say, we found your 
story.” (Invisible Children 2004:12,44)4. They themselves shot and directed the documentary 
Invisible Children: The Rough Cut5 on this voyage. The documentary is told in reality-style 
confessionals, starting by portraying their initial boredom and general naiveté by depicting the 
friends killing a snake and vomiting, pictures Swartz refers to as “details worthy of the stunt-
oriented reality show Jackass.” (Swartz 2012:5). In learning about the night commuters’ plight, 
children who are forced to leave their homes to sleep safely in Gulu town from fear of being 
abducted by the LRA6, the documentary changed to a more serious picturing. When they returned 
home, their aim became to expose what they had witnessed in Uganda by showing their 
documentary in high schools, colleges, and churches throughout the US (Invisible Children 2004).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/invisible-children/ d.22.08.2013 
5 The film both has a 35minute and a one-hour version. References to the movie are based on the one-hour version.  
6 The night commute is a term used to describe the children commuting from their home, often in the displacement 
camps to Gulu each night.  
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In the beginning, the movement’s main purpose was to create awareness of the crimes conducted 
by the LRA in east and central Africa (Invisible Children 2004). According to an interview 
conducted by Finnegan with a staff member of the Invisible Children, the movement “(…) really 
formed as a response to a need to channel energy and resources garnered from the documentary” 
(Finnegan 2011:57). As the movement matured it also began mobilizing to put an end to the LRA’s 
atrocities by lobbying the US government to take military action in the central region of Africa and 
to step up their development aid to Uganda. The movement has grown immensely over the last 
couple of years in terms of staff, both locally in the US and in Uganda, now with a total of 173 
employees (66 in the US department) (InvisibleChildren/staff 2013)7.  
Invisible Children is split into two parts – a US department and one in Uganda. The two almost 
function as two separate organisations. The US department refers to itself as a ‘movement’ and 
focuses on fundraising, awareness, advocacy campaigns, and legislative change through the 
components media and mobilisation. The department in Uganda functions as an aid-driven NGO 
that focuses on implementing livelihood and educational programmes (InvisibleChildren/work 
2013)8. Finnegan states: “I think in the United States is where they really play an activist role (…) in 
Uganda they are sort of an organisation” she adds “In Uganda they don’t play an activist role, they 
play a development role” (Golden 19.03.2012:8,06, 24,29)9.  This thesis will focus on the work of 
the US department, but I will nonetheless give a short presentation of Invisible Children’s work in 
Uganda to get an overall understanding of its work.   
Invisible Children Uganda consists of two components, protection and recovery. The protection 
initiatives include: 1) Protecting the local community from LRA attacks, including an early warning 
system radio network which is a series of high frequency radios that collects information of the 
current location of the LRA and posts it on the digital platform, the LRA crisis tracker. 2) 
Encouraging the LRA to defect peacefully through a) defection fliers planted alongside known LRA 
routes in the bush, and distributed by airplanes flying over LRA areas, and b) through radio 
programs with “come home messaging” (InvisibleChildren/work 2013)10.  
The recovery initiatives include eight programmes: 1) “Schools for schools” rebuild schools in 
northern Uganda and provides school material. 2) “Teacher exchange” strengthens the capacity of 
the teachers by exchanging with a teacher from the US. 3) “The Legacy school program” directly 
supports children by paying their school tuition; the programme includes mentors who work 
alongside the children functioning as a role model. 4) “Village savings & loan associations” brings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 http://invisiblechildren.com/about/our-team/ d.22.08.2013 
8 http://invisiblechildren.com/our-model/ d.26.10.2013 
9 http://thesocietypages.org/officehours/2012/03/19/amy-finnegan-on-uganda-and-kony-2012/ d.22.08.2013 
10 The information is found in the film “protection” on the Invisible Children website. 
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the context of a bank into the local community, where they can invest in themselves, take loans and 
share their profit. 5) “The Functional adult literacy program” teaches adults how to read and write 
to fill out forms and manage businesses. 6) “Water, sanitation & hygiene program” constructs 
boreholes with support from other partners. 7) “MEND” helps women of northern Uganda who are 
directly affected by the LRA to improve their tailoring skills, so they can earn an income from tailor 
work, and 8) “The Rehabilitation project” helps former LRA soldiers to cope with their trauma 
(InvisibleChildren/work 2013)11. 
Invisible Children US operates as an awareness-creating social movement both soliciting for 
donations and selling merchandise to raise money for its cause. The movement’s work in the US 
primarily consists of creating awareness and promoting its cause by dispensing films on the 
Internet making nationwide and international tours presenting the videos in high schools, colleges 
etc. and conducting nationwide campaigns to lobby the US government (InvisibleChildren/work 
2013)12.  
Invisible Children distributes its films, creates awareness, and raises funds through a volunteer 
concept called roadies. Invisible Children runs two roadie tours a year; January to mid-May and 
August to mid-December, where roadies voluntarily travel around the US for four months 
facilitating screening of Invisible Children’s newest films and selling merchandise. The events are 
held at churches, schools, youth groups, concerts etc. The process of selecting roadies is highly 
competitive. To become a roadie, you need to submit an application that includes making and 
publishing a 3-5 minute YouTube video of yourself and your reasons for wanting to be a roadie. 
During the first five weeks, the roadies have intensive training and preparation at Invisible 
Children's local office. They learn to speak in short, quotable chunks which makes it easier to 
spread Invisible Children’s message in a way that seems particularly effective for the college- and 
high school-aged audience who may have little if any prior exposure to the history of Uganda 
(Swartz 2012:12). After the training, the roadies are divided into teams of five; four 
Americans/internationals and one Ugandan, and go on local tours. Each day, they will show 
Invisible Children’s media and “speak to hundreds of students about global citizenship and the role 
that they can play in this larger issue” (InvisibleChildren/job 2013)13. The daily lives of the roadies 
are documented and circulated throughout the movement as videos, images, blog-posts and even 
TV series, thus to be a roadie is to be an embodied character of Invisible Children. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This information is found in the film “Recovery” available through Invisible Children’s website.  
12 The information is found in the film “Mobilization” available through Invisible Children’s website. 
13 http://invisiblechildren.com/jobs/ d.22.08.2013 
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On these tours, it is possible to purchase DVD’s of Invisible Children’s nine major films, but 
Invisible Children does not explicitly use Creative Commons’ licensing14. It practices and 
encourages the free exchange of its materials. Invisible Children states: “As we pass the torch to 
you, we ask you use the documentary and Invisible Children logo responsibly – only raise 
awareness and benefit Invisible Children, inc. We want everyone to have FREE access to “Invisible 
Children: Rough Cut.” Be creative and make your screening unique. The only thing we insist is that 
you don’t charge for admission” (Swartz 2012:12).  
Invisible Children have conducted five major events. The first, called Global Night Commute, on 29 
April 2006 had over 80,000 participants in 125 cities across the US. Its aim was to create 
awareness and solidarity with the night commuters in Gulu. The activists walked from their home 
and schools to the city centre and slept outside. During the sleepover, the participants wrote letters 
to former President Bush and their local congressmen urging them to take action towards ending 
the war in Uganda (InvisibleChildren/event 2013, Catalyst 2013)15. On 28 April 2007, the event 
Displace Me took place and another 68,000 people showed up in 15 different cities across the US. 
The event was a response to Uganda’s Internally Displaced Person Camps. On 25 April 2009, The 
Rescue took place in nearly 100 cities, in nine countries, with an estimated attendance of 85,000 
people. The Rescue campaign asked its attendees to “abduct” themselves for the abducted children 
in northern Uganda until they were publicly rescued by a media mogul. The rescuers included 
Oprah Winfrey, Kristen Bell, Sen, James Inhofe and Rep and John Lewis. The event ‘25’ and break 
the silence took place on April 25 2011 where 91,000 activists pledged to be silent for 25 hours to 
create awareness and an additionally 30,000 people fundraised. The participant’s pledge of 25 
hours of silence symbolised one hour for each year of the conflict’s duration. The silence ended 
with 18 musical events across the US. The event Cover The Night took place on April 20 2012 
where young people from around the world covered their cities with posters of Joseph Kony which 
symbolised bringing justice to Kony by making him famous. The most recent event took place on 17 
November 2012 in Washington DC where more than 12,000 people registered to rally. The event 
took place at the same time as the Global Summit on the LRA where leaders from major 
international institutions and affected region met to discuss possible solutions to the crisis 
(InvisibleChildren/event 2013).  
Invisible Children launched the Kony 2012 campaign in March 2012. The campaign was based on 
the Internet film of the same name. The aim was to make Kony famous to putt further pressure on 
the US government to keep military advisers in east and central Africa (Invisible Children 2012). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 A Creative Commons (CC) license is a public copyright licenses that enable the free distribution of an otherwise 
copyrighted work. http://creativecommons.org/ d.04.11.2013. 
15http://invisiblechildren.com/program/international-events/ & http://catalystconference.com/read/invisible-children-
global-night-commute/ d.22.08.2013 
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The video went viral and reached more than 40 million views in three days making it the fastest 
viewed film on YouTube to date. Invisible Children had its pre-existing network in place which 
initially helped spread the video16. Immediately following the release and the success of the 
campaign, criticism of the movement’s activity and finances surfaced. This will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
3.2 Social movement theory 
In this section, I will give a short presentation of social movement theory mainly based on Sidney 
Tarrow’s (2011) Power in Movement. This theoretical framework is used to analyse Invisible 
Children as a social movement which will give an understanding of its internal and external 
structure.  
The US has a long history of social activism, both focusing on domestic concerns and lobbying on 
behalf of foreign policy issues. The activists interact with stat as well as international institutions, 
and they work with non-state actors and across state borders (Budabin 2011:4). They are an 
important force in today’s post-Cold war era (Kaldor 2003:79).  
Non-state actors are defined as, “actors that are not (representatives of) states, yet that operate at 
the international level and that are potentially relevant to international relations” (Budabin 
2011:30). This includes multinational corporations (MNC’s), non-governmental organizations 
(NGO’s), social movements, trade unions, church and religious networks, criminal networks, and 
terrorist groups (Budabin 2011:30). 
In this section, I will mainly present a theoretical foundation for social movements, and when 
necessary, I will illustrate the distinctions between them and other non-state actors. 
Social movements can be defined in various ways. It is difficult to give a single definition because 
they, by nature, are shifting entities (Earle 2004:1), but “it is generally agreed that social 
movements are organisations, groups of people and individuals, who act together to bring about 
transformation in society” (Kaldor 2003:82). They are contrasted by tightly organised groups such 
as NGO’s or political parties. Where social movement are loosely founded, NGO’s are more 
institutional, structured and generally professional (Kaldor 2003:86). While NGO’s are mostly 
composed of specialized, paid, professional staff and sometimes a limited group of volunteers, 
social movements are largely constructed by their volunteers/members. “Social Movements are 
their members” (Earle 2004:3). Where social movements’ actions and goals are reactive responses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This point will be elaborated in section 4.3.3 
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to national or international politics, NGO’s are more likely to have a fixed set of values and 
priorities (Earle 2004:3). 
Tarrow (2011) argues that ‘contentious politics’ is at the base of social movements and that 
contentious politics frame the movements’ actions towards the external society. Contentious 
politics is defined by Tarrow as “[actions] used by people who have regular access to representative 
institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that 
fundamentally challenges others or authorities” (Tarrow 2011:7).  To this Kaldor adds that 
contentious politics have always existed, but social movements can be described as a modern way 
of conducting contentious politics (Kaldor 2003:82). Tarrow argues that contentious collective 
action serves as the basis of social movements’ action frame because it is the main and often only 
resource that “ordinary” people possess to demonstrate their claims against better-equipped 
opposing groups or states.  
In addition, Tarrow argues that social movements create political opportunities, respond to threats, 
create collective identities, and bring people together to mobilize them against more powerful 
opponents. Social movements also build organisations, elaborate ideologies, socialize and mobilize 
constituencies, and their members engage in self-development and the construction of collective 
identities (Tarrow 2011:7-8). Tarrow adds that the basic properties of a social movement involve, 
“first, mounting collective challenges, second, drawing on social networks, common purposes, and 
cultural framework, and third, building solidarity through connective structures and collective 
identities to sustain collective action” (Tarrow 2011:8). To this Kaldor adds that social movements 
are cosmopolitan because they are concerned with issues that apply to human beings in general 
and not just local interests. They are autonomous and can directly address authorities relevant to 
their concern. They are flexible and develop routines of non-violent protest such as strikes and 
demonstrations that are easily transferable to different situations (Kaldor 2003:83).  
In the following section, I will analyse Invisible Children through the lens of social movement 
theory. This will bring us to a discussion of whether Invisible Children actually can be understood 
as a social movement.  
3.3 Motivating young people 
In this section, I will analyse Invisible Children through the social movement theory to understand 
how Invisible Children is motivating young people to act. This is done by analysing how Invisible 
Children creates collective identity and shared emotions among its members and which actions this 
enables. 
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Tarrow argues that a social movement uses three mechanisms to stimulate contentious action and 
promote solidarity internally in the movement: 1) they frame meaning for action17, 2) they define 
and creates collective identities among its members, and 3) they shape and reflect specific 
emotions to mobilize action (Tarrow 2011:142-143). I will analyse the two last components one by 
one. 
3.3.1 Collective Identity 
Building a shared identity framework between the movement’s members is an important 
component of a successful movement as collective identity ties the movement’s members together 
in a shared cause. Tarrow states that “activists are often faced with the task of building solidarity 
among a diverse membership which can require very careful deliberate identity work” (Tarrow 
2011:152). To this Tarrow adds that collective identity is seen as a “constructed set of boundary 
mechanisms that define who “we” are, who “they“ are, and the location of the borders between 
them” (Tarrow 2011:143).  
In her dissertation, Finnegan found that the members of Invisible Children are predominately 
upper-middle class, white females, adolescent students many of who attend private colleges and 
high schools. Jason Russell agrees and states that the movement’s core is “14-15 to 23-24 year-old 
girls who are white, who have been raised in suburbia, who are Christian, who have enough 
disposable income to donate or buy stuff” (Finnegan 2011:71).  
An activist describes the common identity and the members’ shared worldview as a core element in 
the movement’s success. She states, “Invisible Children can be so effective in motivating people 
[because] they all share a common understanding of the world, common language, common 
experiences” (Finnegan 201:75). Finnegan elaborates, “This common understanding of the world 
reflects the similar backgrounds of Invisible Children activists in the upper-middle suburbs of 
America ” (Finnegan 2011:76). The similarity of the demography is exactly what the founders target 
in their filmmaking. Russell explains that when they are “making films, they are imagining their 
target audience to be a 14-year old high school freshman girl who “would have never thought of 
being a part of something like this”” (Finnegan 2011:71).  
The co-founders and filmmakers playing a lead role in the films is an important factor for the 
identity framework in the movement. In every film, they star as three normal guys and share 
personal anecdotes and events. As an example from the film the Rescue shows, “This story begins 
in the suburbs of California with three normal guys. We grew up surfing, playing sports, and 
goofing around. But the one thing that we had in common is that we all love to make movies” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This is analysed in Chapter 4. 
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(Invisible Children 2009:3,00). The members of Invisible Children identify themselves with the 
founders who in the first documentary “The Rough Cut” were not much older than them. Beth, an 
intern at Invisible Children states, “The movie is just very raw, and it's—even though they were 
older than me they were kids, and you see these kids just go, they see something, they run into a 
problem and they're like, OK, now we have to fix this problem” (Kligler-Vilenchik et al. 2012:8-9). 
Invisible Children’s members identify with the founders’ frank description of themselves as “three 
normal guys” that travel to Africa in search for a story.  
Invisible Children’s media is a key-element in the movement’s success in engaging young people, 
however, not only as entry points for the members’ engagement but also because it sustains them 
by creating shared collective identities. Kligler-Vilenchik et al state, “The organization's "media 
savvy," which members identify as unique, has an important role in creating [Invisible Children's] 
self-perceived image as a young, hip nonprofit” (Kligler-Vilenchik et al 2012:9). Finnegan adds, 
”The biography of the Invisible Children activists – built particularly upon race and class privilege 
– is critical to carrying out this unique form of contemporary activism” (Finnegan 2011:67). As we 
shall see later in this chapter, this target group fits perfectly with Invisible Children’s form of 
activism and fundraising strategy. 
3.2.2 Emotions  
Tarrow explains that shared emotions are essential in order to maintain solidarity among members 
and to transform claims into actions. Tarrow draws on Verta Taylor to explain this, “it is emotions 
that provide the ‘heat’ (…) that distinguishes social movement from dominant institutions” (Tarrow 
2011:153). Similar to the shared demography and worldview and in line with Tarrow’s 
understanding of the emotion work in social movements, the members also share the same 
emotional foundation for being active in Invisible Children. The initial feeling many members 
shared was a surprise of not having any prior knowledge of the conflict. Ruth, a previous intern at 
Invisible Children, states, “I cannot believe that this is going on" and continuous "why have I never 
heard about this. I remember something in me shifted that night” (Kligler-Vilenchik et al 2012:7). 
The motivations for being active in Invisible Children are focused on a wish and an obligation to 
help. For many, the motivational feeling is a perception of one's own good fortune versus the 
hardships of others, and a feeling of obligation to do good in the world (Kligler-Vilenchik et al 
2012:15). With inspiration from Finnegan (2011), the different motivational feelings for being 
involved is divided into four categories: 1) Make a difference, 2) Guilt, 3) Feeling special, and 4) 
Belonging. 
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Kligler-Vilenchik et al. argue that many of the members had an urge to become involved, to make a 
difference - this was a challenge because traditional activist organizations, like the Peace Corps, 
offer limited possibilities for youth under 18 and often require extensive volunteer commitments. 
Other organizations may offer young people opportunities to become involved but are perceived as 
old-fashioned and outdated. Invisible Children has been successful in offering young people 
desirable and concrete ways of getting involved in a young, hip environment (Kligler-Vilenchik et al 
2012:6). Jade, a former intern at Invisible Children, states, “They draw in a different crowd than a 
lot of organizations; other [organizations] draw large donors and we are staffed by young people, 
we focus on young people, and we realize that young people can make a difference if they're really 
passionate about it” (Kligler-Vilenchik et al 2012:9). Each film produced by the Invisible Children 
ends with a small and easy recipe on how people can get involved and make a difference. A member 
elaborates on this point, “Invisible Children goes to great lengths to insure that they are not just 
showing people sad stories for the sake of sad stories, but they are also trying to provoke people to 
take action to address the sad stories” (Finnegan 2011:66). Another member, who left school to 
become a roadie, shares the same feeling. She states, “I felt like that there was something going on 
in the world that I knew about and that I knew I had an opportunity to do something, and how 
could I possibly turn that down and turn these kids down (…) so that’s why I like had to be here, 
and that’s why I didn’t care about leaving school or anything, like I knew it was ok, because I 
needed to help these people and um, I stay because the same reason, because I know what we are 
doing makes a difference” (Finnegan 2011:79).  
In her fieldwork, Finnegan noted the discourse about feeling guilty, the members being aware of 
how well they live, and how difficult it is for others in the world. As an activist states, “I feel guilty 
because I have so much, and I know there are people who don’t have a lot and um people who don’t 
even have safety and security, and I have to try to ensure that other people have what I have” 
(Finnegan 2011:78). This point can be understand in relation to Kaldor’s understanding of social 
movements as cosmopolitical, as the members are concerned with others’ well-being18.  
Feeling special in making activism is, according to Finnegan, grounded in two different aspects: 
the location and focus on innocent children functions as a clear moral framework,19 and Invisible 
Children gives the members the possibility and obligation to make a difference through activism 
such as creating awareness and fundraising. As an activist states, “Invisible Children is great in 
that, they challenge you to do things you didn’t even realize you could do, like plan a giant event 
and make it really successful” (Finnegan 2011:85). Finnegan elaborates, “Invisible Children does an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This point will be further discussed in chapter 4, as is function as an essential component in Invisible Children’s 
motivational framing.  
19 This point will be elaborated in Chapter 4 and 6.  
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excellent job of not only challenging the young people who are involved but also affirming them 
and ensuring that they feel like they are part of something really important” (Finnegan 2011:85). In 
this perception, the collective emotion also underlines the collective identity and worldview 
between the members. 
The members of the Invisible Children feel they belong to Invisible Children’s social network 
because they have made friends. As a staff member explained, “I say people come for the cause and 
stay for the community. You know, they come because their hearts are broken but that doesn’t 
sustain them; you need to look around to see who your sojourners are and if you like them” 
(Finnegan 2011:97). Finnegan also sees the social element as an important feature for the 
members, “Invisible Children activism is an attractive endeavour for young Americans because it’s 
a fun, social outlet, and it provides an important form of collective identity during the challenging 
years of adolescence” (Finnegan 2011:97). The roadie concept helps integrate solidarity in the 
movement. A high school teacher identified the roadies as a crucial component to what compels 
young people to stay engaged “almost every student involved with the movement knows a roadie 
personally, so they feel privy to the information and energy of the hub of the organization and 
movement” (Finnegan 2011:94).  
Summing up, we can see that the shared demography, identity and emotions among the members 
help integrate a feeling of solidarity and belonging to Invisible Children which makes the members 
stay involved. Likewise, Invisible Children gives the members a feeling of obligation and ability to 
make a difference. Thus Invisible Children has been very successful in its mobilising strategy by 
creating strong collective identity and shared motivational emotions. 
3.4 No wave-making activism 
Invisible Children focuses its activism through promoting its media, raising awareness, and 
generating funds. It goes to great lengths to get people involved by making it easy and simple. As 
Invisible Children states in a film, “See a film and then hear a story directly from the heroes who 
have overcome unimaginable odds to bring peace, justice and hope to northern Uganda. Host a 
screening and leave your legacy” (Finnegan 2011:64).  
The roadies help spread the voice of the movement and get people involved. At screenings, the 
roadies explain the simple way of getting involved and making a difference, “We can free them 
from this, he said, by taking one of the following three steps: 1) spread the message by showing the 
film to as many people as you can; 2) wear the Invisible Children t-shirt; and 3) sign-up for TRI-
campaign, which is a campaign to give $3/week to fund advocacy awareness, and events that will 
lead to rescue the child soldiers” (Finnegan 2011:65). Members of the organisation appreciate this 
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simple recipe for action and making a difference. As a roadie explained, “What I love about 
Invisible Children is that they don’t just present a problem. They also present options that you can 
take to address the problem” (Finnegan 2011:66). Another activist elaborates on this point, “It’s 
like you learn about the conflict and there are things you can do to help and there is like this clear, 
easy path to follow.” (Finnegan 2011:81). It is exactly these clear messages of action that the 
members find both easy and attractive.  
The members are encouraged to make innovative fundraising events. Through organized 
competitions, Invisible Children challenges its members to be entrepreneurial and creative in their 
fundraising strategies where members are encouraged to document these tactics on video and 
upload and share them on YouTube (Brough 2012:181). The fundraising strategy has great synergy 
with the members’ identity, as they are able to use their network to access economic resources. 
Finnegan concludes, “All social movements need money but Invisible Children appears to have 
made fundraising a critical component of what student activists do. With the relative 
socioeconomic advantage of most members of Invisible Children, fundraising is an activity in 
which they can easily succeed; thus fuelling their inclination to do something good for others, 
meanwhile also feeling special and heroic in their efforts” (Finnegan 2011:91). 
In Invisible Children’s media, emphasis is placed on the American donor/activist as much as if not 
more than their beneficiaries, the northern Ugandans. According to Brough, “[Invisible Children] 
unapologetically embraces the opportunity for personal growth offered by entrepreneurial 
participation in the humanitarian adventure” (Brough 2012:181). Thus Invisible Children focuses a 
lot of its energy on the members making sure they feel special in their awareness instead of 
focusing on the northern Ugandans it is advocating on behalf of. This is underlined by the 
fundraising competitions that Invisible Children sometimes hosts where the winners win a trip to 
Uganda to visit the schools and camps of internally displaced communities that their funds 
support.20  
According to Finnegan, Invisible Children’s activism is different than other forms of progressive 
activism of social movements, as it embodies a less structural, analytical understanding of the 
situation in northern Uganda, and the tactics it utilizes to address the suffering and human rights 
abuse in the region. Instead of questioning the dynamics that allow a war to persist 25 years, 
Invisible Children simply seeks to obliterate Kony and the LRA in an effort to end the children’s 
suffering (Finnegan 2011:88). In many respects, it becomes more important to do something than 
not do anything. It is the action itself that becomes the focus. Finnegan elaborates, “The most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Invisible Children’s newest campaign #ZeroLRA underlines this point perfectly, as they use 8.30 minutes of the 9.10 
minutes long video to explain the prices and competitions the fundraisers can win. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8o-iwXG4FdM d.17.11.2013. 
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important thing is to take some action, any action: the worst case scenario is inaction in the face of 
suffering, even if the action doesn’t align with addressing the particular social problem” (Finnegan 
2011:80). A member reflects on this point, “(…) this group [Invisible Children] is the total opposite. 
I mean they are not only nonviolent but they are like … non wavemaking, they don’t like to make 
ripples … they want to operate within the system to get as much done as possible instead of flipping 
the system on its head” (Finnegan 2011:89). This easy ‘non wave-making’ activism, where the 
members have been able to create a collective understanding, identity and feelings, has been a very 
successful strategy for Invisible Children. In addition, “(…) the movement does an excellent job of 
ensuring that participants have a face and are not just number in the masses” (Finnegan 2011:94) 
thereby making them special and individual in the collective actions.  
However, as we can see through the theoretical framework of Tarrow, this notion of activism is 
contrary to traditional social movement theory and activity, as social movements normally directly 
seek to disrupt authorities as an integral part of their strategies for change.   
3.4.1 Invisible Children as a social movement 
In this “non wave-making” form of activism lies the question of whether Invisible Children actually 
can be understood as a social movement rather than e.g. a NGO. Tarrow defines social movements 
as conducting contentious actions; meaning acts “that fundamentally challenges other authorities”, 
but as we have seen, Invisible Children does not seek to challenge authorities but instead works 
closely with them. Finnegan explains why by reflecting on Invisible Children members’ common 
background, “It is premised on meritocracy and an acceptance that capitalist economic systems 
and strategic military operatives are viable. It recognizes that, for the most part, the world is a good 
place and that individuals can choose to make the world even better by raising money and talking 
about the horrible atrocities experienced on the other side of the globe” (Finnegan 2011:76). 
According to Earle, social movement is distinguished from e.g. NGOs in the overt politicisation of 
their goal, as “they struggle to integrate previously excluded groups and issues into local or 
national politics” (Earle 2004:2).  In this position, there lies an understanding of social movements 
challenging the political status quo where members often position themselves in clear opposition to 
the government (Earle 2004:2). Even though Invisible Children seeks to lobby the government to 
take action, it is more an effort to get the US to shift priorities rather than fundamentally change 
their policies or orientation towards Uganda. However, this is still a struggle to get the government 
to include capturing Kony into its national politics. Ben Keesey, CEO of Invisible Children 
underlines this point, “The United States will never put our military and our personnel on the line 
for this because there is no national security interests: it’ s not in our selfish priority (…) So until 
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we, as the public, shift that, and say our interest and our priority is not just about us (…) they are 
never gonna change” (Finnegan 2011:103-104).  
Earle further adds that the relationship between social movements and state is complicated. Even 
though movements may often oppose government, they are equally dependent on it to address 
certain wrongs or grant rights, and social movements have to engage in strategic interaction with 
states (Earle 2004:2). Though Invisible Children does not seek to challenge US foreign politics, it 
still engages strategically with it and sometimes successfully. The President of the United States, 
Barack Obama signed the “Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery 
Act” where Invisible Children was one of the advocacy groups that had influenced the bill. Obama 
stated, “We have seen your reporting, your websites, your blogs, and your video postcards – you 
have made the plight of the children visible to us all” (White House 24.05.2010)21.  
Invisible Children fits well into other characteristics of social movements such as: members share a 
collective identity, worldview and feelings which, according to Earle, is the most crucial definition 
of a social movement. Essential for Invisible Children is its creative use of media to tell and share 
its story. It uses film and networking through social media platforms which function as new and 
innovative platforms for activism. Invisible Children’s use of technology is seen as amusing, 
exciting and terrifying in the eyes of its young targets and has been shown to be very effective. 
Invisible Children’s films serve as a platform to advocate its actions and goals, and these have 
changed during their time of activism and lobbying. Where the first goal and actions only evolved 
around creating awareness (TheRoughCut 2004), it developed to focus on rescuing Kony’s child 
soldiers (TheRescue 2009)22 and to making Kony famous in order to keep US military in Uganda 
(Kony2012). 
The discussion on whether Invisible Children is a social movement could be further developed. 
Even though Invisible Children’s politics may not be defined as contentious, it holds many of the 
theory’s other characteristics that are central to the analysis and discussion in this thesis, why I 
find it relevant to refer to it as a social movement. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I have made an argument for how Invisible Children can be understood as a social 
movement. Invisible Children fits well into the most crucial definition of social movements, namely 
creating collective identity and shared emotions among its members. Invisible Children has been 
very successful in building collective identity among its members which is crucial for its success. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-signing-lords-resistance-army-disarmament-and-
northern-uganda-r d.27.10.2023  
22 http://vimeo.com/3400420 d.26.10.2013 
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Invisible Children’s media are naturally the most important aspect in motivating people to get 
involved, as the media often are the members’ first encounter with Invisible Children and its 
purpose. The media target a young demographic who share a common understanding of the world, 
common language, and common experiences. The founders playing a lead role in Invisible 
Children’s media also contributes to the motivational success as the founders becomes a symbol of 
what the young members can accomplish when engaging with Invisible Children.  
The media also creates shared emotions among the members. I analysed these emotions within 
four categories: making a difference, guilt, feeling special, and belonging. First, Invisible Children 
made the members feel that they had an opportunity and obligation to make a difference through 
simple fundraising events. Second, the members feel guilt because they have so much compared to 
the northern Ugandans. This can be understood in line with Kaldor’s cosmopolitical aspect of a 
social movement. This point will be developed in section 4.5. Lastly, the members feel they belong 
to the community of Invisible Children, and it functions as a social outlet based on a hip, young 
environment which sustains the members. 
The collective identity and shared emotions Invisible Children creates among its members 
underlines the no wave-making activism. This form of activism underlines the cultural 
understanding of Invisible Children’s members. It recognizes that the world, for the most part, is a 
good place where the members have the opportunity to make the world even better by fundraising 
events for the Ugandans. The members are attracted to this form of activism as it proposes feasible 
actions that entail a clear, easy path that the members can follow. Additionally, Invisible Children 
is good at recognising each member’s individual effort which makes the members feel special. In 
this no-wave making understanding of action, it becomes important to do something rather than 
not to do anything in the face of the Ugandan suffering. 
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4. Kony 2012 
In this chapter, I will analyse how Invisible Children frames meaning for action through the 
Kony2012 campaign thereby answering the second part of the first question of the main research 
question: How can Invisible Children’s success in framing meaning for action be explained? 
Social movements create meaning for action through their action frame why we need to investigate 
Invisible Children’s action frame in order to understand how it frames meaning for actions in the 
Kony2012 campaign. This is mainly analysed through Benford and Snow’s (2000) theoretical 
framework of Framing Processes and Social Movement. 
First, I will introduce the film, Kony2012 which is the main outlet for the Kony2021 campaign. I 
will illustrate the film’s aim and purpose, the proposed solution and how the campaign called to 
action. Then, I will analyse Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 
campaign. And lastly, I will discuss the critique that emerged immediately following the success of 
the campaign. 
4.1 Introducing Kony 2012 
The Kony2012 campaign was officially kicked off when the 30 minutes long film, with the same 
name, was released on different social media platforms such as YouTube and Vimeo on 5 March 
2012. The goal was to raise awareness of the atrocities committed by Joseph Kony in the hope of 
bringing him to justice. The video quickly spread after Invisible Children’s network of members 
and several celebrities23 tweeted and shared the video on different social media platforms 
(TheWeek 24.07.2013)24. The video reached 100 million views in 6 days which made it the fastest 
growing viral video in history (InvisibleChildren/Kony 2013)25. 
Eight minutes into the film, Invisible Children introduces the films single purpose, namely to stop 
the LRA and their leader Joseph Kony, and the film shows everyone watching exactly how this is to 
be done. Before revealing the details, Russell explains, in simple terms, what Joseph Kony and his 
rebel group the LRA have been doing, “For 26 years, Kony has been abducting children into his 
rebel group the LRA, turning the girls into sexslaves and the boys into child soldiers. He makes 
them mutilate people’s faces, and he forces’ them to kill their own parents. And this is not just a 
few children; it has been over 30,000 of them (…) and as if Kony’s crime isn’t bad enough, he is not 
fighting for any cause but only to maintain his power.” (Invisible Children 2012:11,00). Jason 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Celebrities such as: Rihanna, Oprah, Sean Diddy Combs, Justin Bieber, Nina Dobrev, Ian Somerhalder The Kardashian 
sisters and Nicole Richie all tweeted about Kony 2012 asking their followers to see and share the video. 
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20576894,00.html# d.27.10.2013 
24 http://theweek.com/article/index/226138/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-kony-2012-campaign-a-timeline d.27.10.2013 
25 http://invisiblechildren.com/kony/ d.27.10.2013 
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Russel, the films narrator, states that, “It is obvious that Kony should be stopped. The problem is 
that 99% of the world doesn’t know who he is (…) If they knew, he would have been stopped long 
ago” (Invisible Children 20121:3,30). The film and thereby the campaign “expired” on the 31 
December 2012, giving the campaign a clear ending point where the goals of the campaign, 
capturing Kony, was to be reached.  
Invisible Children is advocating for a simple line of actions to bring Kony to justice, “In order for 
Kony to be arrested this year, the Ugandan military has to find him. In order to find him, they need 
the technology and training to track him in the vast jungle. That’s where the American advisers 
come in, but in order for the American advisers to be there, the US government has to deploy them. 
They’ve done that. But if the government doesn’t believe the people care about arresting Kony, the 
mission will be cancelled. In order for the people to care, they have to know, and they will only 
know if Kony’s name is everywhere” (Invisible Children 2012:21,44). Invisible Children is thus 
arguing that like the invisible child soldiers of Uganda (thereof the movement’s name), Kony is 
invisible, and to bring him to justice by making him famous and shed light on his crimes. Invisible 
Children is therefore specifically targeting twelve politicians and twenty culture makers because it 
argues that the voice of the culture makers/famous Americans spread instantly, and the policy 
makers are being targeted to keep their attention on Kony.  
The film ends with four actions everyone can do straight away to start making Kony famous: 
1. Sign the pledge to show your support 
2. Get the bracelet and the action kit 
3. Sign up for TRI to donate a few dollars a month and join our army for peace 
4. Above all share this movie online, it’s free. (Invisible Children 2012:29,31). 
4.2 Collective action frame 
In this section, I will give a theoretical introduction to the framework of “collective action frames” 
which I will use to analyse how Invisible Children frames meaning for action. 
Benford and Snow have adapted the concept of framing from Erving Goffman (1974). Goffman’s 
concept of framing was focused on individuals but has later been related to how social movements 
construct meaning for action. Goffman defined frames as denoted “schemata of interpretation that 
enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrence within their life space and the 
world at large” (Benford&Snow 2000:614). Benford and Snow understand frames as helping to 
render events or occurrences meaningfully and thereby function to organize experience and guide 
action. 
Snow and Benford (1992, 2000) argue that collective action frames have an interpretive function 
by simplifying and condensing the “world out there”, and by selectively punctuating and encoding 
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objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past 
environment with the intention to mobilize potential members. Thus collective action frames are 
action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and 
campaigns of social movements (Benford&Snow 2000:614, 1992:137,). Punctuating refers to, 
“collective action frames [that] serve as accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the 
seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was 
previously seen as unfortunate” (Snow&Benford 1992:137). To this, Snow and Benford add that 
framing a sequence of events as unjust is not sufficient. Some sense of blame or causality needs to 
be specified as well as a corresponding action for solving or ameliorating the situation. Social 
movements orient their frames towards action and at the same time fashion them at the 
intersection between a target population’s inherited culture and its own goals and values (Tarrow 
2011:145) as we saw in section 3.3. 
Collective actions frames are, according to Benford and Snow, constituted by the “core framing 
tasks” which holds three components: 1) diagnostic framing understood as problem identification 
and attribution, 2) prognostic framing understood as articulating a solution, and 3) motivational 
framing which analyses the members’ agency and the motivation for action (Benford&Snow 
2000:615). I use these three components as an analytical strategy to structure the analysis of how 
Invisible Children frames meaning for action. I will analyse Invisible Children’s framing processes 
by analysing these three components one by one.  
4.3 Diagnostic framing – assigning blame 
The first component, diagnostic framing, focuses on blame and responsibility - especially 
identifying the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents. A social movement needs to 
form an agreement regarding the nature of the problem, deciding who and what to blame 
(Benford&Snow 2000:616). 
To assign blame and responsibility in campaigning, Invisible Children needs to frame the 
information so that it fits the diagnostic framing. We can understand the framing of information 
through Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) theoretical framework Transnational Advocacy Network26. 
Keck and Sikkink understand information framing as a core element to motivate political action. 
Influence is gained by presenting alternate sources of information which provide not only facts but 
testimonies - stories told by people whose lives have been affected by some event or unjust 
situation. Facts and testimonies are interpreted by framing issues in simply terms of right and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 I use Keck and Sikkink’s theoretical framework to underline the need of information framing, in order to frame 
meaning for action. I am not interested in analysing Invisible Children as a transnational advocacy network, in section 
2.3.2 I have made an argumentation for this theoretical use.  
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wrong, as their purpose is to persuade people and stimulate them to act (Keck&Sikkink 1998:18-
19). Thus Invisible Children, in its diagnostic framing, frames the information in the campaign in 
terms of blame and responsibility. It does this to show that a given state of affairs is neither natural 
nor accidental, to identify the responsible party and to propose credible solutions. 
The Kony2012 film has a clear focus on three individuals who each play a central role in telling the 
story of northern Uganda and assigning right and wrong in the war: 1) Jason Russell, the films 
narrator, 2) the Ugandan Jacob who’s testimony frames the conflict, and 3) Gavin, Jason Russell’s 
son, who functions as an innocent character who hears about the conflict for the first time and 
reacts instantly.  
Jason Russell plays a lead character throughout the film. He gives the viewer an understanding of 
the history of the war and its implications. The film begins by picturing personal events of his 
private life such as his wife giving birth, pictures of himself and his son Gavin doing normal 
everyday things thus putting himself at the centre of the story. He shows the viewer his first 
meeting with Jacob and the other ‘invisible children’ affected by the war, and he shows his promise 
to Jacob - ‘the promise that was going to change his life’. “Everything in my heart told me to do 
something. And so, I made him a promise: We are also going to do everything that we can to stop 
them (…) We are, we are going to stop them [the LRA]” (Invisible Children 2012:7, 30). This 
promise is what founded the Invisible Children. The film portrays Russel and later Invisible 
Children as American heroes saving innocent children in Africa. Russell further adds, “I made that 
promise to Jacob not knowing what it would mean but now I do. Over the past nine years, I have 
fought to fulfil it. And the fight has led me here; to this movie you’re watching. Because that 
promise is not just about Jacob or me, it is also about you. And this year, 2012, is the year when we 
can finally fulfil it” (Invisible Children 2012:7,59). He thereby shows that his fight has become 
everyone’s fight for a better, united world. 
When we meet Jacob for the first time, he and his friend are just two of the hundreds of children 
who are commuting to Gulu every night to sleep safely in protection from the LRA-kidnappings. 
Jacob tells his heartbreaking story of his and his brother’s abduction by the LRA and how they 
killed his brother right in front of him when he tried to flee. This is the only Ugandan testimony in 
the film, and it becomes the main expression of the need and suffering of the children of Uganda 
who are portrayed as innocent victims. “Jacob: So it is better when you kill us. If possible you can 
kill us, you kill us. For us, we don’t want now to stay. Russell: You don’t want to stay on earth? 
Jacob: We are only two, no one taking care of us. We are not going to school. Russell: you would 
rather die than stay on earth? Jacob: Yes. Russell: Now, even now? Jacob: Even now, how are we 
going to stay now in our future?” (Invisible Children 2012:6,07). Jacob thereby gives the 
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impression that there is no reason for the children of northern Uganda to live, and shows the 
viewers that this is what Invisible Children is fighting for.27    
Gavin, Russell’s son, represents the innocent and purely goodhearted child who hears about the 
conflict for the first time and reacts instantaneously. “Russell: What do I do for a job? Gavin: You 
stop the bad guys from being mean. Russell: Who are the bad guys? Gavin: Uhm… Starwars people 
(…) Russell: This is the bad guy, Joseph Kony [showing him a picture of Kony]. Gavin: This is the 
bad guy [pointing at the picture]? (…) Russell: Joseph Kony, he has an army. Okay. And what he 
does is he takes children from their parents, and he gives them a gun, and he makes them shoot 
and kill other people. Gavin: But they are not gonna do what he says ‘cause they are nice guys, 
right? Russell: They don’t want to do what he says. But he forces them to do bad things. What do 
you think of that? Gavin: …Sad” (Invisible Children 2012:9,16). Latter in the film, another scene 
with Gavin appears as directly continuing the first scene. “Russell: What do you think we should do 
about it? Gavin: We should stop him!” (Invisible Children 2012:13,02). 
Through these testimonies, it becomes clear that Invisible Children is assigning blame and 
responsibility for the atrocities committed to the northern Ugandan population to Joseph Kony 
and framing the children of Uganda as innocent victims of Kony’s atrocities. This diagnostic 
framing can be understood as an injustice framing, as it is addressing unjust suffering. Tarrow 
draws on Barrington Moore to make the point that any movement against oppression “has to 
develop a new diagnosis and remedy for existing form of suffering (…) by which this suffering 
stands morally condemned.” (Tarrow 2011:145). As we have seen, the Kony2012 campaign is 
framed through a very simple storyline focusing on unjust action towards the victims, the children 
of northern Uganda, and the responsible enemy, Joseph Kony. Through Jacob’s testimony, 
Invisible Children portrays the children’s fear and suffering of the child-abduction by Joseph Kony 
framing them as the innocent victims that everyone watching should help save by engaging with 
Invisible Children. Furthermore, the horrific actions of Kony, who is mutilating, abducting and 
destroying his own ethnic group, is framed as pure evil and comparable to the world worst 
criminals28 which is underlined with Invisible Children arguing that Kony does not have any 
“political goal” and “is not supported by anyone” (Invisible Children 2012:19,02).  The co-founder 
Laren Pool exemplifies this very well when he states, “After 23 years, we know what we need to do 
to stop this senseless violence. It’s one man. It’s Joseph Kony. He’s a monster (…) this one man is 
preventing millions of people from going home (…) he is the world’s first and arguably the worst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Jim Moore sees this interview with Jacob as the most troubling part of the Kony2012 film. Moore argues that it is 
unwillingness to let Jacob finishing his sentences – Russell interrupts Jacob three times, where Moore understand the 
tone of his interruption as shock and dismay, which he argues are more about how Russell feels listening to Jacob, than 
what Jacob is feeling the needs to express. Were Russell focuses on Jacob death wish, and Jacob on what is lacking in his 
life (Moore 2012:96). 
28 This point is elaborated in section 4.5. 
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criminal near here. Not because of him but because of the victims – because of the mothers, the 
children, the people in the IDP camps – they stand with us to hopefully end Africa’s longest 
running conflict” (Finnegan 2011:101).  
We can thereby understand Invisible Children’s diagnostic framing as an injustice frame – 
assigning blame and responsibility to Joseph Kony who it frames as pure evil without any political 
goal. The northern Ugandans are framed as innocent victims who need to be saved by the 
American heroes. In picturing Gavin testimony as the innocent pure boy’s understanding of the 
world as good vs. bad, he becomes a motif that substitutes for the audience’s instant reactions. If 
Gavin a 5ish year old boy can understand and support the campaigns simple solutions to stop Kony 
then so can everyone.  
4.4 Prognostic framing – a simple solution 
Prognostic framing, the second core framing task, involves the articulation of the proposed 
solutions to the problem or at least a plan of attack and strategies for carrying out this plan 
(Benford&Snow 2000:616). Prognostic framing addresses what is to be done in relation to the 
diagnostic framing as assigning blame and responsibility to a specific problem constrain a range of 
possible solutions and strategies (Benford&Snow 2000:616).  
As we saw in the section 4.1, Invisible Children is articulating a simple line of actions to reach the 
proposed solution: a military intervention to capture and bring Joseph Kony to justice. In order for 
this to happen, Invisible Children argues that we need to make him famous to make people care 
and make the American Government take action. To do this, Invisible Children encourages the 
viewers of the video to share it and targeted twenty preselected culture makers29 and twelve 
policymakers30 to speak the voice of Invisible Children and “use their power for good”. Invisible 
Children is targeting celebrities because, Invisible Children argues, they “have a loud voice and 
what they talk about spreads instantly” (Invisible Children 2012:23,17). It is targeting policymakers 
because it is the policymakers who have “the authority to see Kony captured” (Invisible Children 
2012:24,02). 
Invisible Children already had a pre-existing network of members in place to ”like and share” the 
Kony2012 video through their social media profiles on Twitter, MySpace and Facebook. The 
support from the members was essential to help spread the video. Additionally, Invisible Children 
made it easy for its members to lobby the chosen target audience. Visitors on Invisible Children’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The target celebrities are: Ben Affleck, Justin Bieber, Bono, Stephen Colbert, George Clooney, Ellen DeGeneres, Jay-Z, 
Angelina Jolie, Lady Gaga, Rush Limbaugh, Rihanna, Bill O’Reilly, Ryan Seacrest, Taylor Swift, Tim Tebow, Rick Warren 
and Oprah Winfrey. The billionaires: Warren Buffett, Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg.  
30 The target policymakers are: George W. Bush, Kay Granger, Patrick Leahy, Bill Clinton, Condoleezza Rice, John Kerry, 
Mitt Romney, Harry Reid, Stephen Harper, John Boehner, Ban Ki Mon and Ileana Ros-Lehtine. 
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website were encouraged to click on the images of the chosen culture- or policymaker after which 
an auto-generated tweet would pop up which pings the chosen celebrity and asks him/her to view 
the video and support the cause. This could be done with just two clicks (D’Zurilla 04.03.2012, 
SocialFlow 14.03.2012)31. The outcome of this tactic was thousands of tweets targeted at celebrities’ 
tweeter-accounts. E.g. Ellen Degeneres had over 36,000 tweets directed at her pleading her to 
respond to the cause, as did Justin Bieber, Lady Gaga, Oprah etc. Nine of the twenty target 
celebrities chose to publish their support to the cause. When the celebrities started to share and 
tweet about the video, it gave the campaign additional attention (SocialFlow 14.03.2012).  
Through this kind of leverage politics, Invisible Children is making it very easy to “care” and to 
have a loud voice. Starring as the lead focus in an episode of the TV-series Veronica Mars in 2007 
and being interviewed by Oprah Winfrey on her show in 2009, Invisible Children already had 
many celebrities advocating to support and enter actively into its cause. These and many other 
celebrities tweeted about the Kony2012 campaign and helped the film to spread fast.  
Richey and Ponte have focused on the increasing engagement of celebrities as development actors.  
They argue that celebrities “have become the faces of doing good, of credibility, and of 
believability” (Richey&Ponte 12:2014), adding that celebrities have become trusted advisors in 
development issues that extend beyond the actual scope of their relevant experiences. It is not in 
the scope of this thesis to argue the role of celebrities in development, but through Richey and 
Ponte’s analysis, we can understand why Invisible Children targets celebrities in its awareness 
campaigning. Target faces like Bono, George Clooney and Oprah have a credible history of 
engaging in development campaigns why their voices advocating for Kony2012 is an important 
element in spreading the message and underlining its credibility.  
Summing up: Invisible Children’s prognostic frame is articulating a military intervention to 
capture Kony as the only possible solution to bring him to justice. The American advocacy role is to 
show the US government that the people care about ending the war in Uganda by advocating 
preselected celebrities and policymakers to share and care through social media platforms. 
4.5 Motivational framing – call to arms 
The last framing component, motivational framing, provides a ”call to arms” that entails the 
rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action. This is also understood as the agency 
component that through socially constructed vocabularies provided adherents with compelling 
accounts for engaging in collective action (Benford&Snow 2000:617). I will analyse this vocabulary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/gossip/2012/03/kony-2012-which-20-celebrities-were-targeted.html d.16.08.2013 & 
http://blog.socialflow.com/post/7120244932/data-viz-kony2012-see-how-invisible-networks-helped-a-campaign-
capture-the-worlds-attention d.23.10.2013 
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through Invisible Children’s use of slogans and how these “call to arms”. Afterwards, I will 
demonstrate how the slogans relate to two motivational values analysed through Schwartz’s value 
system presented by Holmes et al (2011) and Darnton and Kirk (2011). 
The film ’Mobilization’ presents Invisible Children’s understandings of successful activism. For 
Invisible Children a key element for a successful movement is a clear, conceivable goal and an 
unwavering commitment to achieve it, it state, “We are committed to empowering everyone who 
encounters our tours and our films, to take direct action by engaging their political leaders and 
amplifying the voices of the LRA affected communities” (InvisibleChildren/work 2013:2,35), and 
further adds, “The goal has always been to turn awareness into effective actions, and online 
connection into a real life experience” (InvisibleChildren/work 2013:6,24). 
Invisible Children uses multiple slogans in its campaigning to empower and stimulate such actions. 
The slogans mostly refer to activism and getting people involved in the movement. One of the most 
famous slogans presented in teaser for the official Kony2012 film states, “Don’t study history – 
make history” which is followed up by “stop at nothing”(Invisible Children 2012a:1,02)32. The 
slogan underlines the point that action should be taken now and argues that we need to make 
history instead of studying it. Likewise “stop at nothing” shows Invisible Children’s commitment to 
end the atrocities in Uganda by bringing Kony to justice. 
Another slogan presented in the Kony2012 film states, ”We see these kids, we hear their voice, this 
war must stop, we will not fear, we will fight war” (Invisible Children 2012:17,10). Linking this 
slogan to the one above, Invisible Children underlines the point that it is ready to use any means 
possible to stop the war in Uganda by referring to its advocacy as fighting a war. 
One of the Kony2012 posters carries a strong symbolic message. The 
poster displays Joseph Kony together with Osama Bin Laden and Adolf 
Hitler, thereby giving the impression that Kony is comparable with the 
one of the world’s worst mass murders, Hitler, and with America’s 
favourite public enemy, Bin Laden. The poster serves as a clear 
branding of Kony as pure evil. The film also shows pictures from the 
Holocaust and the Rwanda genocide to underline the same point of 
evilness. References to the genocide in Rwanda, just a decade earlier, 
are linked with the feeling of guilt because of the US’ failure to 
intervene. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwN-WZjgrSQ&feature=c4-overview-vl&list=PL3C099B53D7DB6C1D 
d.15.08.2013. 
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The poster and the slogans all aim to frame the Ugandan war and the action one should take 
towards it in a simple, dualistic, evil vs. victim understanding.  
Another Kony2012 poster shows the inverted power triangle that symbolises a new understanding 
of world power, “It’s always been that the decisions made by the few with money and power 
dictated the priorities of their government and the stories in the media. 
They determine the lives and the opportunities of their citizens. But now, 
there is something bigger than that. The people of the world see each other 
and can protect each other. It’s turning the system upside down, and it 
changes everything” (Invisible Children 2012:27,05). By making the 
triangle a symbol of Invisible Children and calling its members “the fourth 
estate”, it is referring to a new understanding of power in the world where 
Facebook and other social media are connecting people which give them a 
new power to influence governments. The global connection also 
symbolises the global citizenship and equality among all human beings. 
Invisible Children argues that the world is connected through social media where we share ideas 
and do not think in borders – thereby moving towards a global cosmopolitical understanding. The 
argumentation is that it becomes Invisible Children’s (and everyone else’s) responsibility to 
promote justice in the world, starting with the arrest of Joseph Kony. 
Invisible Children is focussing its action frame on a specific set of values. According to Holm et al 
(2011) and Darnton and Kirk (2011), values represent the root of the motivational system. They are 
our guiding principles by which we act. They influence the attitudes we have, and how we evaluate 
both our own actions and those of others (Holmes et al 2011:8, Darnton&Kirk 2011:40).  
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Holmes et al and Darnton and Kirk draw on Schwartz’s value system which comprises 56 value 
‘labels’ that can be boiled down into just ten values types, highlighted in the figure.33 All people 
hold all values but the balance between them vary from individual to individual. The degree of how 
easy or difficult people hold two particular values reflect the level of compatibility or conflict 
between them (Darnton&Kirk 2011:41). Compatible values appear adjacent to one another, and 
conflicting values appear opposite. 	  
Looking closer at Invisible Children’s slogans, they emphasized a need for social justice, equality, 
responsibility and power for change. Compared with the motivational value system, I will argue 
that Invisible Children is advocating within the values of ’Universalism’ and ’Benevolence’. These 
values can be seen to motivate action to tackle a wide range of ‘bigger then self’ problems 
(Darnton&Kirk 2011:43). According to Holmes et al, the values represent: 1) Universalism: 
understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and nature, and 
2) Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of welfare of people with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact (Holmes et al. 2011:12).  
In understanding these values, in relation to the cosmopolitical goals Invisible Children is 
advocating for, we can see that Invisible Children is emphasizing what Miller calls strong moral 
cosmopolitanism which argues that all human begins are subject to the same set of moral laws why 
we must show equal moral concern and responsibility for human beings everywhere (Miller 
2007:24,44)34. In this particular world-view, we have a moral responsibility to help the Ugandans 
in their plight, as we would expect others to help us if we were in same situation. Additionally, we 
saw in section 3.3.2 that the members experience a feeling of an obligation to act with statements 
like, “I have to try to ensure that other people have what I have” and “I had an opportunity to do 
something” which also underline the values of universalism and strong moral cosmopolitanism 
that Invisible Children uses to punctuate its framing for action to call to arms.  
4.6 Criticism and responses 
In the following, I will discuss the criticism that followed immediately after the release and success 
of the Kony2012 film. In this section, I will briefly illustrate the main critical points before going 
into a deeper discussion with the critical points that relate to the framing of meaning for action as 
this is most relevant for the thesis’ main research question. This is done to investigate which 
implications Invisible Children’s frame of meaning for action create and will raise important 
questions of knowledge and responsibility. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Rather than occurring randomly, the values are related to each other; some were unlikely to be prioritized strongly at 
the same time by the same individual, where others often was prioritized strongly simultaneously (Holm et al 2011:12). 
34 Miller himself dismisses this strong version of moral cosmopolitanism, and is arguing for a weaker version in relation 
to responsibility. This discussion is interesting, but not relevant for this thesis.  
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Critics accuse the young members of engaging in slacktivism - practicing easy meaningless forms 
of social action that does not go beyond pressing ‘share’ on social medias and have little or no effect 
beyond making themselves feel good. Additionally, some critics argue that the Kony2012 activism 
is a form of consumerism where Invisible Children encourage purchasing a $30 action kit and sign 
up to donate to make social change (Rowland 3.11.2012)35. 
The military intervention, Invisible Children is advocating as the solution to stop Kony, has also 
received criticism. Scholars have pointed out that the Ugandan army and president Moseveni have 
an incentive for keeping the LRA alive as it justifies the Ugandan government’s high defence 
budget (de Waal 10.02.2012)36. Keating argues that stopping Kony will not change anything, and if 
more hardware and money flow was add to Museveni's military, Invisible Children's campaign may 
even worsen some problems (Keating 07.03.2012)37. Other have added that the Ugandan military 
has a poor human rights records in northern Uganda which is why a military intervention may 
bring further harm to the northern Ugandans. To this other critics add that the LRA is no longer in 
Uganda and even that LRA no longer represent any major threat to the stability in the region. De 
Waal states that peace and stability began returning to northern Uganda seven years ago with focus 
on reconstruction and reconciliation of the communities (de Waal 11.03.2012).  
Invisible Children has also been criticised for its use of economic resources, as it spends less than a 
third of the money it raises directly on the Ugandan development programmes. The majority of its 
funding is focused on advocacy, filmmaking and fundraising (Zuckerman 8.03.2012)38. 
One of the main critiques towards the Kony2012 campaign has been that Invisible Children is 
oversimplifying the conflict, focusing on just one bad guy who should be stopped by these very 
simple actions, making the conflict ahistorical. It has raised the question of bad advocacy 
(badvocacy) and whether it is always better to do something. 
Additional critics argue that Invisible Children gives no agency to the Ugandans and the local 
initiatives in the area. The main criticism argues that Invisible Children’s advocacy focuses on 
American awareness - American solutions with American military intervention, not including any 
local initiatives or solutions  (Zuckerman 8.03.2012). Moore argues that the missing dates of the 
footage are a fundamental problem. According to Moore, this is important because dateless footage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mikaela-luttrellrowland/consumerism-trumps-educat_b_1337067.html 
d.23.10.2013. Jenkins argue however that this critique ignores the possibility that the movie may be meaningful in 
mobilizing young people as civic actors http://henryjenkins.org/2012/03/why_youth_are_drawn_to_invisib.html 
d.22.10.2013. 
36 http://africanarguments.org/2012/03/11/don’t-­‐elevate-­‐joseph-­‐kony-­‐by-­‐alex-­‐de-­‐waal/	  d.20.08.2013  
37http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/07/guest_post_joseph_kony_is_not_in_uganda_and_other_complicat
ed_things?wp_login_redirect=0 d.23.10.2013 
38 http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2012/03/08/unpacking-kony-2012/ d.23.10.2013 
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of sobbing African children reinforces the media stereotypes about Africa as a place of unending 
violence (Moore 2012:94)39.  
In the following, I will discuss the last two critical points more comprehensively, as I understand 
them as essential in relation to the framing meaning for action conducted by Invisible Children in 
the Kony2012 campaign. 
4.6.1 A simple ahistorical campaign 
According to Keck and Sikkink, it requires clear powerful messages that appeal to shared principles 
to make an effective action frame that often have more impact on state policy than advice of 
technical experts. An important part of the political struggle over information is precisely whether 
an issue is defined primarily as technical and is subject to consideration by “qualified” experts or as 
something that concerns a broader global constituency (Keck&Sikkink 1998:19). 
In Russell’s statement, “Because that promise is not just about Jacob or me, it is also about you”, he 
is advocating for a shared, global responsibility to take action towards ending the conflict in 
Uganda. In this particular world-view, we have a moral obligation to help the Ugandans in their 
plight. Invisible Children is then advocating that arresting Joseph Kony is not just a political 
technical problem nor is it natural or accidental. In this framing, it becomes a problem of the global 
community where everyone can and should do everything possible to stop Joseph Kony because 
“it’s the right thing to do”. 
To this, Keck and Sikkink point out, there can be a conflict in the multiple goals in the campaigns, 
they state, “To be credible, the information produced by networks must be reliable and well 
documented. To gain attention, the information must be timely and dramatic. Sometimes these 
multiple goals of information politics conflict, but both credibility and drama seem to be essential 
components of a strategy aimed at persuading publics and policymakers to change their minds” 
(Keck&Sikkink 1998:19). 
The critiques against the Kony2012 campaign have been that Invisible Children has chosen the 
dramatic presentation of war in Uganda over the credible use of information. Dramatic and 
emotional pictures and stories have gotten more attention in the campaign than credible solutions 
and reliable, well-documented information. Sverker Finnström refers to this dramatic, emotional 
argumentation as “magical”40. He states, “The most prominent feature of the Invisible Children 
films is the creation and constant re-creation of a magical master narrative; the lobby reduces, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The two last critical point will be discussed here, but further elaborated Chapter 6 
40 Finnström defines magic as: ”That which we do not yet understand, a measure of your our incomprehension of local 
explanations for any given situation” (Finnström 2012:128). 
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depoliticizes and dehistoricizes a murky reality of globalized war into an essentialized black-and-
white story that pits the modern Ugandan government and its international partners against the 
barbarian LRA” (Finnström 2012:130). Finnström’s main critique is that Invisible Children is 
turning a very complex civil war into a good vs. bad ahistorical focus and ignores that the proposed 
solution, a military intervention, will have serious consequences for the population of Uganda. He 
states, “The world viewing Joseph Kony as a global poster boy for Africa’s problems will, to be sure, 
make things worse for him; however, the increased foreign and domestic military presence will also 
serve to further militarize the region as a whole, as governments sending armed forces can justify 
their actions by magically referring back to Kony” (Finnström 2012:133)41. Alex de Wall echoes the 
same critique towards Invisible Children putting focus on the previous atrocities committed by 
Ugandan governments and president, Yoweri Museveni against the northern population, stating, 
“In elevating Kony as a global celebrity, the embodiment of evil, and advocating a military solution, 
the campaign isn’t just simplifying, it is irresponsibly naïve” (de Wall 11.03.2012), referring to the 
fact that a military solution will play well into the Ugandan governments interests. 
Invisible Children answers these critiques in the film ‘Kony 2012 part 2’, a follow-up from 
Kony2012. In the first scene of the film, Nobert Mao, former presidential candidate in Uganda 
states, “Let those who are professors write their books and create academic awareness. But this one 
grabs you by the gut and shakes you until you are forced to pay attention. That’s the essence of 
awareness; people are now forced to pay attention” (Invisible Children 2012b:0,52)42. In the next 
scene, Jolly Okot, Invisible Children’s country director and the person who introduced the 
founders to the conflict in 2003, states, “Awareness is number one, number two: action and a way 
forward” (Invisible Children 2012b:1,10). Nicholas Kristof, an American journalist working with 
issues in Africa also expresses the need for raising awareness and is argues that the film’s 
simplified messages are what is getting the viewers’ attention, “Complexity is, er, complicated: It 
has been a leading excuse for inaction during atrocities – during the Armenian genocide, during 
the Holocaust, during Rwanda, during the Bosnian slaughter. Each episode truly was complicated, 
but, in retrospect we let nuance paralyze us.” (Kristof 14.03.2012)43. Kristof thereby argues in line 
with Invisible Children’s politics of any action is better than no action – like the undertone of one 
of Invisible Children’s slogans: “Don’t study history, make it”, calling its members to action. 
We now have a clear understanding of how Invisible Children frames meaning for action, 
additionally we have seen why Invisible Children choose to frame its information in simple terms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Finnström further adds that Invisible Children does not take the US geopolitical interest into account, as Uganda both 
is a country rich on national resources, and with neighbouring countries which have been terrorists safe places.  
42 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_Ue6REkeTA d.20.08.2013. 
43 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/opinion/kristof-viral-video-vicious-warlord.html?_r=0 d.20.08.2013. 
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However, taking the criticism into action it is less clear whether we can understand this framing as 
knowledge. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
4.6.2 Ugandan agency 
Another critique raised against the campaign is the missing representation of the Ugandan 
community and initiatives. Finnegan raises this point in her dissertation, as she states, ”it seemed 
apparent that most US activist hadn’t given much thought to the notion that there may be Ugandan 
activist or groups based in Uganda who were also working for very similar forms of social change 
pertaining to peace and human rights” (Finnegan 2011:107-108).  
Keck and Sikkink focus on the process of which testimony is discovered and argue that the 
presented normally involves several layers of prior translation. They add, “There is frequently a 
huge gap between the story’s original telling and the retellings (…) Local people, in other words, 
sometimes lose control over their stories in a translation campaign” (Keck&Sikkink 1998:19). This 
point can address the problematic of the missing Ugandan voice. Many critics see Invisible 
Children’s narrative on Uganda as portraying its people as victim who lack agency, voice, will or 
power to act why it calls upon an external cadre of Invisible Children’s members to liberate them by 
removing the bad guy who is causing their suffering. 
Rosebell Kagumire, a Ugandan journalist and coordinator for ‘Africans act for Africa’ has raised 
this critique. She states, “This is another video of an outsider trying to be a hero rescuing our 
children. We have seen these stories a lot. It does not end the problem” (Rosebell 
08.03.2012:2:50)44. She further adds, “How you tell the story of Africans is much more important 
than what the story is actually. Because if you are showing me as voiceless, as hopeless, you have no 
space telling my story, you shouldn’t be telling my story if you don’t believe that I also have the 
power to change what is going on, and this video seems to say that the power lies in America, and it 
does not lie with my government, it does not lie with local initiatives on the ground. That aspect is 
lacking. This is the problem. It is furthering that aspect of Africans, totally unable to help 
themselves and needing outside help all the time” (Rosebell 08.03.2012:3,22). 
Another Ugandan, Teddy Ruge, the cofounder of the Project Diaspora, an online platform for 
discussing matters regarding development on the African continent, speaks more critically towards 
the campaign and development aid in Africa in general. He states, “It is a slap in the face to so 
many of us who want to rise from the ashes of our tumultuous past and the noose of benevolent, 
paternalistic, aid-driven development memes. We, Africans, are sandwiched between our 
historically factual imperfections and well-intentioned, road-to-hell-building-do-gooders. It is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 http://rosebellkagumire.com/2012/03/08/kony2012-my-response-to-invisible-childrens-campaign/ d.02.08.2013. 
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suffocating state of existence. To be properly heard, we must ride the coattails of self-righteous 
idiocy train. Even then, we have to fight for our voices to be respected” (Ruge 18.03.2012)45.   
Miller underlines this point when he talks about the remedial responsibility we have to help those 
in need. He states, “Not to respond to the needs of the famine victims would be a moral failure, a 
failure of respect. But it is also a failure of respect if we (…) treat people simply as passive recipients 
of our aid, and not as agents who are potentially able to take charge of their own lives” (Miller 
2007:7). Miller thereby argues that even though we have a remedial responsibility to help those in 
need we equally have a responsibility to respect their agency. These critical statements show us 
that Invisible Children’s effort to stop Kony has a negative influence on the self-understanding of 
the Ugandans as it weakens their agency. Neera Chandhoke (2002) elaborates on this point as she 
argues, “People are disempowered rather than empowered when highly specialised, professional 
(…) civil society actors tell them what is wrong with their daily existence and how they should go 
about resolving the problems” (Chandhoke 2002:47). 
In Finnegan’s fieldwork investigating in and around Gulu, she found that local northern Ugandan 
activists did not raise as strong a critique towards Invisible Children46. Many saw the growing 
interest in Uganda as a positive thing, a male, adult, Acholi activist stated, “For me, it is something 
positive, yeah, why? Because it means that the world knows our plight” (Finnegan 2011:145). In her 
dissertation, Finnegan showed how the Acholi population appreciated the attention created on 
their behalf, telling their story which the Ugandan government had silenced for decades. Invisible 
Children’s media served a function of recognition and validation of their suffering at the hands of 
both the Ugandan government and the LRA. It gave them hope and the feeling that they are not 
alone (Finnegan 2011:147). However, even though there generally where a positive view on the 
work of Invisible Children, the activists in Finnegan’s fieldwork still raised critical voices against 
Invisible Children’s simple storytelling on the history of northern Uganda. They articulated a 
concern about misunderstanding the conflict, in particular the role of the Ugandan government. 
Likewise Invisible Children’s military strategy as a solution raised concern. Instead of a military 
intervention, the Ugandan activists works for peace and human rights and are more concerned 
with developing and rebuilding the region and working towards a more equitable and dignified 
community for the present and future generations (Finnegan 2011:119). The activists see peace 
building, peace talks and reconciliation as the most desirable solution to end the conflict and 
reconcile the Acholi population.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 http://ugandaspeaks.com/2012/03/a-peace-of-my-mind-respect-my-agency-2012/ d.19.11.2013 
46 Finnegan conducted 22 semi-structured interviews with 29 Ugandans activists in northern Uganda, concentrated 
around Gulu town. Additionally she conducted five focus groups interviews, and did participatory of ethnography with 
three establish social movements (Finnegan 2011:284-285). 
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Thus in Finnegan’s findings, we can understand that the Ugandan activists do not see a military 
strategy as a solution to the conflict. They rather see this as putting the population at further risk of 
attacks. Likewise, given the previous history, the Acholi population does not trust the Ugandan 
military not to harm the local community and therefore does not wish to give them the power or 
legitimacy to end the conflict. 
Looking at Invisible Children’s prognostic framing and the Ugandan activists desired next step, it 
stands as complete opposites. Where Invisible Children holds the LRA as the only responsible 
party for the war, the Ugandan activists also hold the Ugandan government responsible for failing 
or not wishing to cease the LRA’s violence for over two decades. Where Invisible Children 
advocates for an end to the conflict through a military intervention, the Ugandan activists seek 
reconciliations and peace talks with the LRA and the Ugandan government. 
As we saw above, social movements use local testimonies to strengthen their information framing, 
but listening to the critique of the Ugandans, certain historical aspects are missing from this 
framing. In Invisible Children’s successful attempt to create awareness and activism towards 
Uganda, the Ugandan activist effort has been overshadowed. Additionally, Invisible Children’s 
members hold relatively more power than the Ugandan activists and thus displace the effort of the 
Ugandan activists (Finnegan 2011:183). 
This tension between the simple storylines and the lack of Ugandan agency, highlight important 
questions of responsibility. In which way can we hold Invisible Children responsible for the 
implications of its framing of meaning for action? 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen that Invisible Children frames meaning for action in the Kony2012 
campaign through its collective action frame, through the components diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framing. 
Through diagnostic framing, we found that Invisible Children is assigning blame and responsibility 
for the war in Uganda to Kony, framing him as pure evil, the northern Ugandans as innocent 
victims, and itself as American heroes, as portrayed through the three testimonies. Additionally, I 
argued that the diagnostic frame could be understood as an injustice frame as Invisible Children is 
framing the situation in Uganda as unjust. 
Through prognostic framing, we saw that Invisible Children is articulating a military intervention 
as the only solution to stop the war in Uganda. Here, the American advocacy role is primarily to 
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leverage preselected celebrities and policymakers through social media platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter. This underlines the no wave-making activism I found in Chapter 3.  
Through motivational framing, we found that Invisible Children call to arms through two central 
values, universalism and benevolence which is an expression of a moral cosmopolitanism that 
argues all human beings must be shown equal concern. This aspect also underlines the shared 
emotion work we saw in Chapter 3. 
Lastly, I looked at the criticism towards the campaign, discussing how Invisible Children is 
oversimplifying the conflict and do not give any agency to the northern Ugandans and local 
initiatives and which implications this brings. This discussion raised important questions of 
knowledge and responsiblity. I asked whether we could assign credibility to the campaign’s framing 
of meaning for action thus understand it as knowledge which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. I also asked whether or not Invisible Children is responsible for the implications of the 
framing which will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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5. Epistemology  
In this chapter I will explore and answer the questions found in section 4.6.1, thereby answering 
the second question of the main research question: “How can this framing of meaning for action 
be understood as knowledge?”  
Before turning to this I will introduce virtue feminist epistemology, and explain key concepts 
within epistemology. Using Nancy Daukas’ theory of epistemic trustworthiness (2006, 2011) 
Epistemic Trust and Social Location and Altogether Now: A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to 
Pluralism in Feminist Epistemology, I will analyse whether we can understand Invisible Children 
as epistemically trustworthy in its Kony2012 campaign, if it is not epistemically trustworthy in its 
framing of meaning for action then it is not to be trusted in its campaigning. I thereby examine 
whether we can understand the framing of information in the Kony2012 campaign as knowledge. 
To get a more thorough understanding of the missing Ugandan voice in the Kony2012 campaign I 
will look into Miranda Fricker’s understanding of Epistemic Injustice (2011) and analyse whether 
this applies in the Kony2012 campaign.  
5.1 Virtue epistemology 
Virtue epistemology is a contemporary philosophical approach to epistemology that stresses the 
importance of intellectual (epistemic) virtues. Virtue epistemology emerged as an alternative to the 
internalism/externalism47, and foundationalism/coherentism48 disputes, where virtue 
epistemology changes the expression for apprehending knowledge of the form “S knows that p”, by 
amending these formulas with virtue theory applied to intellect virtues. Virtues thus become the 
main focus for assessing knowledge.  
Daukas argues that virtue epistemology is often understood as the epistemic analogue of virtue 
ethics as its approach is agent-centred, contrary to traditional epistemology that is principle-
centred. She explains that, “principles-centered epistemology asks questions such as, ‘what criteria 
must a belief satisfy in order to constitute knowledge?’ and ‘what are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a belief to be justified?’, and agent-centered epistemology asks questions such as, 
‘what does it mean to be a knower?’, or, ‘what is involved in being an excellent epistemic agent?’” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 These concepts will be explained below.  
48 Foundationalism: The foundation for knowledge and justification is: 1) a persons immediate awareness of his or her 
own conscious states of mind, together with 2) his or her a priori grasp of self-evidently true propositions. Belief deriving 
from these two sources requires no further justification. Whereas the central claim of coherentism is that the sole basis 
for epistemic justification is relations among beliefs (rather then belief and some kind of foundation as the 
foundationalism refers to) – what justifies belief is the way they fit together: the fact that they cohere with each other 
(BonJour 2010:177,187). 
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(Daukas 2011:46). These questions are responded to in terms of epistemic virtues, understood as 
states of mind that disposes an agent to fulfil (or skilfully strive to fulfil) epistemic goals such as 
maximizing true beliefs, and minimizing false beliefs, acquiring significant knowledge, or 
developing significant understanding (Daukas 2011:46).  
Internalism  
The fundamental claim of internalism is that epistemological issues arise and must be dealt with 
from within the individual person’s first-person cognitive perspective, appealing only to things that 
are accessible from this standpoint (BonJour 2010:204). According to BonJour, the basic rational 
for internalism is that what justifies a person’s beliefs must be accessible to her. Internal epistemic 
justification depends only on the matters which are within the cognitive grasp of the agent in 
question, it is matters that are accessible from within her first-person cognitive perspective 
(BonJour 2010:204). Other epistemic elements, such as testimony, are seen as indirectly available 
as a basis for justification; they can be established by reasoning from what is internally available 
(BonJour 2010:206).    
According to Daukas, internalist virtue epistemology interprets virtues as enduring dispositional 
habits of mind required for responsible epistemic agency. Self-reflective epistemic agents 
deliberately develop virtues over time, motivated by an explicit desire for acquiring significant 
knowledge and understanding (Daukas 2011:47). 
Externalism 
Opposite to internalism we find externalism. Externalists do not require that a belief need have any 
accessible cognitive support. Instead, externalists believe that epistemic justification can depend 
(entirely) on matters external to one’s cognitive grasp. A belief might be justified for an agent if the 
causal process that led to its adoption is cognitively reliable. If the belief-producing process is 
reliable, then it will be objectively probable that the belief is equally reliable. Therefore such a 
process leads to a high proportion of true beliefs, where the degree of justification only depends of 
the degree of reliability (BonJour 2010:208-209). 
According to Daukas, externalists define epistemic virtues as ‘faculties’ or ‘mechanisms’ (such as 
perception, memory, and inferential abilities) that reliably produce true beliefs, with no awareness 
or epistemic motivation on the part of the agent assumed or required (Daukas 2011:46-47)49. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Daukas herself is a weak reponsibilist/reliabilist hybrid, who takes epistemic trustworthiness to be the primary 
epistemic virtue around which others are organized (Daukas 2011:47). 
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5.1.1 Feminist virtue epistemology 
Feminist epistemologists have investigated the role of gender and oppressed groups in knowledge 
production. They are in general motivated by a political project of eliminating the oppression of 
women, where the interest has been in how norms and practices of knowledge production affects 
the lives of women implicated in systems of oppression (Grasswick 2006:1). Feminist 
epistemologists seek to understand both how the social relations of gender shape our knowledge 
practises and how these relations ought to be relevant in knowledge practices, thus making it a 
normative project (Grasswick 2006:1-2).  
Daukas generally characterizes feminist epistemology as grounded in the awareness that gender, 
and more generally, the ‘social location’ or ‘situatedness’ of the subject of knowledge, matters to 
knowledge of practices and production in contextually variable ways. She elaborates, “the ‘social 
location’ of the knowing subject matters to feminism and epistemology, in ways that may vary with 
different contexts of inquiry, and in ways that have powerful social/political consequences” 
(Daukas 2011:48). 
5.2 Epistemic trustworthy agents 
In this section I will give an introduction to Nancy Daukas’ (2006, 2011) theory of epistemic 
trustworthiness. Then I will analyse to what extent Invisible Children can be understood as a 
trustworthy agent.  
According to Daukas, we function as epistemic agents in all aspects of our lives. Epistemic 
functioning often and perhaps always involves the exchange of epistemic goods; sharing 
testimonies50 and a shared acceptance of the epistemic norms that guide the practices that yield 
those goods. Social functioning therefore requires epistemic cooperation and epistemic 
cooperation requires trust. The central discussion in this Chapter concerns what is required for an 
epistemic agent to be worthy of this kind of trust. This question is both concerned with moral 
character and the relation between moral character and social practices, as well as with epistemic 
character and the relation between epistemic character and social practices which Daukas 
understands as the epistemic dimension of trustworthiness (Daukas 2006:109). 
Epistemic trustworthiness is both character-based and connected to truth. It holds epistemic 
agents accountable for their beliefs and responsible for the character of their epistemic interactions 
with others (internalism), and it requires epistemic virtues to reliably produce true beliefs and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Daukas understand all epistemic actions as exchange of testimonies, which differs from the testimonial understanding 
we saw in Keck & Sikkink’s Transnational Advocacy Network Theory. Their testimonial focus was on the personal 
testimony – ones personal story. When I am referring to testimony in this chapter, testimony is understood from Daukas 
definition.   
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understanding, thereby holding agents accountable to how things are (externalism) (Daukas 
2011:50). Daukas argues that, “epistemic trustworthiness is socially inculcated, complex character-
based, veritistic virtue that supervenes on a relation among first-order beliefs, and (often tacit) 
second-order beliefs about one’s own and others’ epistemic competencies” (Daukas 2006:109). 
First order beliefs are understood as one’s internal beliefs, and second order beliefs link individual 
epistemic agency to broader social practices, guiding the ways in which we present ourselves and 
‘read’ others as epistemic agents (Daukas 2006:109, 2011:57). E.g. a member of Invisible Children’s 
first order beliefs in the encounter with the Kony2012 film could be that we have an obligation to 
help. The second other beliefs occurs in the interaction with the other members view of Kony2012 
and because we would presume they match each other, then, the members can form a collective 
identity and engage in social practice with each other.  
In order to investigate epistemic trustworthiness, I will make the general assumption, “that all 
participants in an epistemic community are morally trustworthy in the sense that they are 
benevolent, and they sincerely believe what they say, say what they sincerely believe, and behave 
consistently with those beliefs (when truth and understanding alone are the aim)” (Daukas 
2006:110)51. Imagine that an epistemic agent S asserts that proposition P. Then it is in virtue of our 
assumption that S is morally trustworthy, as defined above, and that we experience her assertion 
not merely as providing the information that ‘S says that P’ but showing that ‘S believes that P’ 
(Daukas 2006:110). However, when engaging epistemically with S’s asserting that P, then Daukas 
argues, more than the assumption of moral trustworthiness is required. We must experience her 
assertion as a reason for us to believe that P or at least as a reason for us to consider the possibility 
that P be worth taking seriously (Daukas 2006:110).  
This means that our starting point in the investigation of Invisible Children as a trustworthy agent 
is assuming that it is benevolent, that it sincerely believe the information it is providing in the 
campaign, and that it behaves consistently with this belief. We must also experience its assertion in 
the Kony2102 campaign as a reason for us to believe it or at least consider it as worth taking 
seriously.   
According to Daukas, the example above is the normal practice of epistemic interaction and 
cooperation. It requires that members of an epistemic community typically make the presumption 
that other agents are credible. In making that presumption, we follow what Daukas considers to be 
an epistemic principle of charity (EPC) (Daukas 2006:110). The idea that a principle of charity is 
required for assessing credibility is based on Donald Davidson’s work in radical interpretation. 
Radical interpretation addresses the problem that it is only possible for me to assign meanings to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 This premise will not be repeated, but is the foundation for the rest of the arguments in this Chapter.  
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your utterances by interpreting your linguistic behavior as meaningful, if I presume your utterance 
is true beliefs. This I cannot do without knowing what you believe which presumes that we share a 
body of beliefs. Davidson (1986) councils us to interpret speakers as holding true beliefs (true by 
our light at least), that is to extend the epistemic principle of charity whenever it is plausible to do 
so (Daukas 2006:110, Davidson 1986). 
If we consider a situation in which we self-consciously decide to engage in a given assessment 
conducted by Invisible Children, like the Kony2012 campaign. Then we would like to know whether 
or not Invisible Children would behave epistemically competent in asserting P, that is if Invisible 
Children would assert that P only if it has justified beliefs that P or whether it would not. If 
Invisible Children frequently and sincerely claims an epistemic authority that it does not possess, 
that is if Invisible Children makes the assessment of P that it does not have justified belief in, then 
it is not worthy of trust in an epistemic sense and we should not believe that P or seriously consider 
the possibility that P on the strength of its testimony alone. But if Invisible Children usually exerts 
epistemic authority only when it does possess it, then it is worthy of trust and we should believe 
that P or at least seriously consider that P on the strength of its testimony alone (Daukas 2006:110-
111). 
Summing up: “In extending that principle of charity to individual A, we presume that A generally 
(…) expresses epistemic authority when and only when in fact she possesses that authority. It 
follows that it is a necessary condition of effective and productive epistemic practice that 
participants be epistemically trustworthy (…), and that engaging in cooperative epistemic activities 
requires presuming that we, and those with whom we interact, are epistemically trustworthy” 
(Daukas 2006:111).  
The ideal epistemic trustworthiness (ET) is defined as: 
ET (ideal): A is epistemically trustworthy if and only if A is disposed to behave (when contextually 
appropriate) as though her epistemic status is S if and only if her epistemic status is S (Daukas 
2006:111). 
ET implies that an (ideally) epistemic trustworthy agent confidently asserts that P only if she 
knows that P, expresses doubt about P only if she has reason to doubt that P etc. (Daukas 
2006:111)52. To this Daukas adds that when A asserts that P, the more implausible that P is or the 
more that is at stake in the question whether P, the higher degrees of trustworthiness is required of 
A, and the more confident we must be about the assertion before we are willing to accept her claims 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 To this Daukas adds that none of us is perfect, and that any given individual will be more or less epistemically 
trustworthy, at a time, relative to a particular domain or subject matter. (Daukas 2006:111). 
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(Daukas 2006:111). Thus we would require Invisible Children to have a high degree of confidence 
in its assessment of the Ugandan history because, taken the seriousness of the criticism into 
account, there is a lot at stake in its assessment. 
The above characterization of epistemic trustworthiness, ET (ideal), should therefore be qualified 
as follows: 
ET (qualified): A is epistemically trustworthy in circumstances C with respect to domain D, if and 
only if A is disposed to behave as though A’s epistemic status in C with respect to D is S if and only 
if A’s epistemic status in C with respect to D is S. (Daukas 2006:112). 
When we extend or withhold EPC, we express (some level of) confidence regarding the epistemic 
status of our beliefs concerning others’ epistemic character and abilities. If we are to be 
epistemically trustworthy that confidence must be warranted, just as our confidence regarding our 
own epistemic status must be warranted. The degree of our own epistemic trustworthiness 
regarding propositions in domain D in a given situation depends not only on the accuracy of our 
assessment of our epistemic status with respect to D, it also depends on our assessment of the 
epistemic status of others in relation to D, and our level of confidence regarding that assessment 
(Daukas 2006:113). Thus epistemic trustworthiness is not only concerned with Invisible Children’s 
assessment that P, but also includes the members who extent EPC to this assessment. If the 
members are to be epistemic trustworthy, their confidence in extending EPC to Invisible Children’s 
assessment that P must be warranted. Daukas thereby broadens the spectrum of epistemic 
trustworthiness to not only focus on the assessment of the history of Ugandan in the Kony2012 
campaign to also include those who trust it. When, and if, we chose to understand Invisible 
Children as trustworthy it also defines our own epistemic trustworthy character. 
According to Daukas, epistemic trustworthiness is character-based from its relation to dispositions 
and traits. Daukas argues that traits like excessive diffidence, or excessive self-confidence will 
affect whether or not A remains unsure about P even after significant consideration, or very quickly 
comes to feel certain that P even without good reason. In either case, her epistemic trustworthiness 
is compromised. But if A is epistemically trustworthy to some reasonable degree, she will have 
developed a stable virtues character to which she is disposed to be confident to the degree 
appropriate to the circumstances (Daukas 2006:112-113).  
We can therefore understand our character traits, also understood as virtues, as prerequisites for 
our epistemic trustworthiness. I will therefore investigate Invisible Children’s character traits to 
analyse whether it is trustworthy or not.  
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5.2.1 Invisible Children as a trustworthy agent 
According to Daukas, we develop our epistemic character through practice and habituation by 
internalizing norms that determines what degree of confidence is appropriate or what degree of 
epistemic deference or skepticism should be extended. Daukas understands this process as 
depending, in part, on learning to ‘read’ and respond to the epistemic statements we receive from 
others to whom we extent EPC. She states, “We form, test, and revise our epistemic conception of 
others and ourselves in part by checking our first order beliefs against theirs, in light of our 
conception of their epistemic characters, and what we sense to be their conceptions of our 
epistemic character” (Daukas 2006:114). To this Daukas adds, “We strive to bring our beliefs in 
line with the beliefs of those whom we trust and admire, and therefore those to whom we extend 
the epistemic principle of charity; we expect our beliefs to differ, and possibly deliberately distance 
them, from beliefs of those from whom we withhold the epistemic principle of epistemic charity. 
And of course the same is true of others as they interact with us” (Daukas 2006:114). 
When applying this theory to Invisible Children’s members, we can understand them as still 
developing their epistemic character due to their young age. As we saw in section 3.3.1, the 
members share a common language, experiences, and understandings of the world. They also more 
or less have the same background and therefore share the same habituation and (to some extent) 
engaging in the same epistemic practice. As they share common beliefs and admiration, the 
members of Invisible Children can easily extend EPC to each other. 
Invisible Children’s founders own personal descriptions, testimonies and appearance in each film 
serves to connect them with the members with whom they share similar demographical 
characteristics. Being the lead characters in the films and the head speakers of the campaign, the 
founders also become the main testifiers of Invisible Children’s beliefs to whom the members 
extend EPC.  
Invisible Children’s roadies also serve as a key factor. As described in Chapter 3, their main 
purpose is to create awareness on behalf of Invisible Children thereby extending Invisible 
Children’s epistemic beliefs. And as we see in Section 3.4.2, the roadies help integrate solidarity 
and promote closeness in the movement as most members know a roadie personally which make 
them feel privy to Invisible Children’s beliefs and thereby more willing to extend EPC to them.   
Taking Daukas’ theory into account, it then becomes clear why the different groups in Invisible 
Children easily extend EPC to each other as they share common demography, identity, and feelings 
in relation to the assessment of Invisible Children. But as I mentioned above, this is not enough in 
order to be epistemically trustworthy. A trustworthy ‘testifier’ needs to be sure only to claim that P 
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in circumstances where it is reasonable for it to believe that it has knowledge that P. And because 
Invisible Children’s assessment P in the Kony2012 campaign focuses on the northern Ugandans 
history that underlines its prognostic framing; a military intervention, I will argue that there is a lot 
at stake in its assessment which is why it, according to Daukas, requires a high level of 
trustworthiness from Invisible Children. This raises the question of whether Invisible Children 
actually know or have good reason to believe the information it put forward in the Kony2012 
campaign. 
To examine this, I will look closer at the Kony2012 campaign. In section 4.3.1 we saw that Invisible 
Children enhances three testimonies in the Kony2012 campaign; the founder Jason Russell, his son 
Gavin, and the northern Ugandan Jacob. Through Keck and Sikkink we understood that the use of 
testimonies in campaigns was a way for social movements to frame information to make it seem 
more credible to the recipients. Additionally, the Kony2012 campaign is also drawing on a range of 
statements from experts, celebrities and local Ugandans to underline its advocacy. The lead expert 
character Luis Moreno Ocampo, the former head prosecutor for the ICC, appears several times in 
the video. Ocampo both underlines the necessity of arresting Kony and celebrates the work of 
Invisible Children. One of Daukas first assumptions was that we tend to trust testimonies as being 
true unless we have good reason not to. Building the campaign on personal testimonies and 
getting, what we assume to be, experts like Ocampo to support Invisible Children’s advocacy makes 
it apparent why so many, at least at the first glance, extend EPC to Invisible Children. 
If we look at the critiques towards Invisible Children, it mainly focuses on the ahistorical and 
depoliticising aspects of the campaign, referring to the missing historical and political aspect of the 
Ugandan story. Turning it around, the campaign is (almost) not criticized for the information it put 
forward, but for the information it did not share, did not know or did not think was important53. 
But as we saw in section 4.3.1, both western critics and northern Ugandans found the missing 
information relevant in order have a holistic understanding of the war in Uganda which is why they 
did not find Invisible Children to be epistemically trustworthy in the Kony2012 campaign.    
Remembering Daukas’ first premises, we should understand Invisible Children as honest and 
benevolent, therefore not choosing to hide important information in a bad faith. Invisible Children 
not asserting that P or missing that P in its testimony is related to epistemic virtues – whether 
Invisible Children possess the epistemic skills, abilities and attitudes which are required for 
successful P-related inquiries (Daukas 2011:51). Different epistemic virtues becomes important in 
different epistemic settings, and it is our ability to apply the correct virtues in the given setting that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This point is only referring to the historic assessments of Ugandan history in the Kony2012 campaign, not to the 
proposed solutions to it. I understand Invisible Children’s proposed solutions to the conflicts as grounded in their 
historical account on the Ugandan history. This chapter will only concern their historical/epistemic assessments. 
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makes us trustworthy agents. In order to examine whether Invisible Children is a trustworthy agent 
I will look into its epistemic character and virtues. In order to do this I will divide Invisible 
Children into three groups; 1) the founders54, who first claimed P, 2) the members, who extent EPC 
to them, and 3) the roadies. 
The founders 
To examine whether the founders’ epistemic character are trustworthy, we need to examine their 
epistemic virtues. Daukas states that developing reliable and accurate virtues is no easy task and 
requires effort, “most obviously, being epistemically trustworthy requires the right degree of 
confidence with respect to one’s salient beliefs under relevant kinds of circumstances” (Daukas 
2011:51). The epistemic virtue of self-confidence should, according to Daukas, be tempered with 
the appropriate amount of humility and yet empowerment. Daukas states, “At a minimum, 
appropriately tempered epistemic self-confidence requires a finely-tuned ability to discern what 
features of different contexts are most salient to a given inquiry, what is required epistemically for 
a given inquiry in light of its context and goals, the degree to which one is, and is not, equipped to 
meet those requirements (and how), and how salient features of one’s epistemic situation compare 
to, contrast with, or complement those of others” (Daukas 2011:52). 
Looking at the founders confidence testimonies in the Kony2012 film, it seems as the founders 
have a high degree of self-confidence in their assessment that P, as they confidently assess the 
history of Uganda, diagnostically framed who is to blame, and present specific solutions to the 
problems in its prognostic framing. Looking at the critics toward the campaign, we can understand 
it as though they think the founders have a too high degree of self-confidence in their assertion that 
P which is keeping them from making the further required epistemic investigations, and thereby 
keeping them from asking the required questions to holistically understand the history of Uganda. 
The position the critics take is holding the founders epistemically responsible for the questions 
they did not pose, the information they did not share, and the aspects they did not integrate in 
their framing of meaning for action which is why the critics do not extend EPC to them and do not 
understand them as epistemically trustworthy agents.  
Looking at the founder’s goal with the campaign’s collective action frame, it is clear that it was not 
to get a holistic understanding of the war but to create awareness as means to stop the war. Their 
answer to the critique are that a holistic epistemic investigation of the Ugandan history would 
paralyze us from taking action, thus putting action not epistemic trustworthiness into focus. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 One could argue that the employees of Invisible Children, who also develop the campaigns and advocacy would be a 
part of this group in the division, but as they haven’t been a central part of this thesis, I will leave them out of the 
discussion.  
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However, Daukas’ theory of trustworthiness holds a truth component; the external reliabilist 
understanding requires epistemic agents to have true beliefs or at least justified beliefs in the 
assessment that P. Daukas would therefore reject the notion of epistemic advocacy to a create 
action without holding, at least, justified beliefs in its assertions in the Kony2012 campaign, 
especially when it is required that the founders have a high degree of trustworthiness on account of 
the seriousness of the implications its framing of meaning for action creates. Actions can be 
founded on basis of epistemic assessment, but Invisible Children cannot substantiate epistemic 
trustworthiness on the basic of action only55, at least not in a reliabilist understanding. According 
to Daukas, Invisible Children needs to have both internal and external justification for their belief, 
where the external understanding holds a truth component not related to action. I can therefore 
conclude, through Daukas theoretical frame of trustworthiness, that Invisible Children is not 
trustworthy in its assessment of the Ugandan history in the Kony2012 campaign. 
The members  
In the section above it became clear why the members of Invisible Children easily extended EPC to 
the founders’ epistemic assessment in the Kony2012 campaign. Through Daukas we also 
understood that when the members extend EPC, they also express confidence concerning the 
founders’ epistemic character and abilities. In the understanding of epistemic trustworthiness the 
confidence in the founders’ epistemic assessment must be warranted in order for the members to 
be trustworthy. But as we saw in the previous section, the founders is not trustworthy in their 
assessment that P, and I can therefore make the argument that the members are not trustworthy in 
extending EPC to the founders assessment in the Kony2012 campaign. 
On the other hand, it can be questioned how high expectations we should have of the young 
members who are still just forming their epistemic character. As we can see, both here and in 
Chapter 4, the founders have gone to great length to make the video and campaign appear credible 
using personal testimony which we, in our everyday epistemic practice, take to be a source of 
knowledge. However, in light of the heavy amount of criticism of the campaign, one could argue 
that even though the members were warranted in extending EPC to the campaign at first glance, 
then, in order to be epistemically trustworthy the members have an epistemic duty to recognise the 
heavy amount of critiques towards the campaign and search for further information on the history 
of Uganda, on which they can form a thorough understanding. Not making this effort would mean 
that the members only rely on untrustworthy information in their epistemic understanding of the 
history of Uganda which also makes their understanding of the war in Uganda untrustworthy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This aspect is further discussed in section 6.2.3 
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The roadies 
Similar to the members, we can understand why the roadies easily extent EPC to the founders 
assessment. The difference between the roadies and the “ordinary” members is that the roadies are 
communicating the assessment of Invisible Children, and thus become a more integrated part of 
the founders’ assessment because they transmit and advocate Invisible Children’s beliefs. The 
roadies therefore need to be even more warranted in their confidence to the founders’ assessment 
to be epistemic trustworthy. And as with the members, the roadies have an epistemic duty to 
recognise the heavy critique and in this light search for further information. In not making this 
effort the roadies, like the members, are not epistemically trustworthy in their understanding and 
assessment of the history of Uganda. 
5.3 Epistemic injustice 
In order to understand the northern Ugandans missing voice in the Kony2012 campaign, and the 
outrages it has created among some prominent Ugandan bloggers, we will look into José Medina’s 
(2011) and Miranda Fricker’s (2007) understanding of stereotypes and prejudice, and how these 
can create epistemic injustice towards certain stereotypical groups.  
First I will introduce Medina’s and Fricker’s understanding of stereotypes and prejudice, and how 
these can affect the testimonial exchange between different stereotypical groups, when one group 
does not extend EPC to the other on account of prejudice. This will lead to a discussion of whether 
we can understand Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action as epistemic injustice 
towards the northern Ugandans.  
5.3.1 Prejudice and stereotypes 
Daukas argues that most epistemic agents have an internalized view of stereotypes regarding the 
cognitive and moral traits of a specific kind of people situated in a specific social setting. The 
stereotypes are typically understood as social group with one or more attributes that is used to 
generalize and distinguish them from other groups (Daukas 2006:114, Fricker 2007:30). Epistemic 
agents perceive, to a varying degree, individuals as members of groups and in virtue of that 
membership we more or less appropriately, prima facie, extend EPC. This because most everyday 
testimonial exchange require hearers to engage in social categorization of speakers which is why 
stereotypes are foundational for testimonial exchange (Fricker 2007:31). Fricker understands 
stereotypes in a neutral sense, where different stereotypes may or may not be reliable. To this she 
adds, “If stereotypes are widely held associations between a group and an attribute, then 
stereotyping entails a cognitive commitment to some empirical generalization about a given social 
group” (Fricker 2007:31). 
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Fricker is particularly interested in the link between unfairly biased credibility judgments and 
identity prejudices. Fricker defines prejudice as “judgment, which may have a positive or negative 
valence, and which display some (typically, epistemic culpable) resistance to counter-evidence 
owing to some affective investment on the part of the subject” (Fricker 2007:35). To this Fricker 
adds that negative identity prejudices are prejudice with a negative valence held against people 
because of their social group. When stereotypes are associated with false identity prejudice the 
stereotypes embody an unreliable empirical generalisation. When such a prejudice is a pre-
judgement interpreted in an internalist vein, made or maintained without proper regard to 
evidence, then, we should perceive such prejudices as epistemically culpable (Fricker 2007:32-33). 
The negative and positive prejudices about a particular group circulating in a culture can denigrate 
or elevate the epistemic character of the members of that group affecting how they are perceived 
(Medina 2011:16).  
Medina and Fricker argue that identity-prejudice are related to the assessments of epistemic 
authority that institute both undeserved credibility deficits and undeserved credibility excesses56 
(Medina 2011:16, Fricker 2007:17). When subjects receive undeserved credibility deficits they can 
be stigmatized by negative identity prejudices, and may not be regarded as normal epistemic 
subjects, and as reliable conveyers of information. They will therefore not receive proper 
recognition in their testimonial exchange. When epistemic agents tends to receive credibility excess 
from most interlocutors, they are likely to develop an epistemic arrogance which results in a range 
of epistemic virtues are moving out of their reach, rendering them closed-minded, dogmatic, 
blithely impervious to criticism etc. (Fricker 2007:20, Medina 2011:16).  
Following this theory, I will argue that we can understand Invisible Children and their members as 
part of a dominant stereotypical group who receive credibility excess. The stereotypical group that 
Invisible Children has membership in is understood as the white American hero, who is saving 
innocent Africans from suffering, as we saw in section 4.3. According to Daukas, members of such 
a stereotypical group risk that they witness their role models treating members of other groups as 
epistemically inferior, in which case they may develop unwarranted confidence in their own 
epistemic abilities in relation to others. Where members of the less dominant stereotypical group 
such as the northern Ugandans, understood as the poor victim who needs to be saved, may come to 
have little confidence in their epistemological abilities because people who they perceive as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 To this Fricker argues: “The primary characterization of testimonial injustice […] remains such that it is a matter of 
credibility deficit and not credibility excess” (Fricker 2007:21), she offers two arguments for this claim: 1) she contends 
that a credibility excess does no immediate harm, even if it can have a cumulative unfair effect, and 2) she argues that a 
credibility excess on someone’s part cannot be automatically correlated with a credibility deficit in someone else’s part, 
for credibility is not a scarce good of which we have a finite and limited amount and, therefore, distributive fairness (i.e. 
getting an equal share) does not apply to this epistemic quality. This discussion is interesting, but not necessary to this 
thesis, why I will not go further into it.  
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authorities treat them as having credibility deficits (Daukas 2006:115). I will develop this 
argumentation as we go deeper into the analysis and understanding of epistemic injustice. 
Fricker defines epistemic injustice as, “wherein a speaker receives an unfair deficit of credibility 
from a hearer owing to prejudice on the hearer’s part” (Fricker 2007:9). To this Fricker adds that 
testimonial injustice has to be systematic so to say that the prejudice towards a stereotypical group 
has to ‘track’ it through different dimensions and epistemic interactions (Fricker 2007:27). 
According to Medina, “epistemic injustices (…) are created and maintained through a sustained 
effort over time and across interactions, and cannot, therefore, be confined to a single moment of 
testimonial exchange” (Medina 2011:17). 
When looking at the Kony2012 campaign and the division of stereotypes I made above, I can ask 
whether the missing voice of the Ugandan, seen in section 4.6.2, is an expression of epistemic 
injustice towards the northern Ugandans. To explore this I will analyse a testimonial exchange 
between Invisible Children and the Ugandans. I understand the testimonial exchange between the 
two groups as 1) Invisible Children’s Kony2012 campaign, and 2) the Ugandan reaction to the 
campaign, this I will relate to the diagnostic injustice frame, seen in section 4.3, which I will argue 
can be understood as a situated understanding which may affect the testimonial exchange in direct 
or indirect ways. 
5.3.2 Testimonial exchange and credibility  
According to Daukas, we, in our everyday epistemic practice, take testimony of others to be a 
source of knowledge. We assign different amount of credibility and put different value on different 
testifiers/stereotypes in particular situations, stereotypes are likely to work their way into our 
background presuppositions and thereby lay the groundwork for the problem of epistemic 
exclusion. Daukas argues that, “We will be disposed to expect members of some groups to be more, 
or less, epistemically valuable than members of other groups, and those expectations will inflect 
our interpretation of their epistemic behavior, and our dispositions to extend, and withhold, the 
epistemic principle of charity to particular others” (Daukas 2006:115). We can understand the 
founders of Invisible Children as the primary testifier being the originators of the campaign and 
the northern Ugandans, the members, the critics etc. as the receivers of their testimony. The 
northern Ugandans reaction on the campaign is analysed as their testimonial response to Invisible 
Children.  
Through Daukas, and as we saw in the previous section, Invisible Children as a stereotypical group 
is likely to extent EPC to itself and to groups whom it resemble, we also saw why the critics did not 
find Invisible Children trustworthy in its Kony2012 campaign. The northern Ugandans had a 
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similar reaction. In the section 4.6.2, we saw that the Ugandan bloggers Kagumire and Ruge had a 
very critical view of Invisible Children’s assessment in the Kony2012 campaign. They understood 
Invisible Children’s testimony as showing them as voiceless victims, and Invisible Children’s 
representation of the northern Ugandans as paternalistic and neo-colonialistic. However, we also 
saw that other Ugandan activists did not raise as strong a critique because they appreciated 
Invisible Children creating awareness on their behalf, finding that Invisible Children’s advocacy 
validated their suffering. It is clear that the Ugandan bloggers do not find Invisible Children 
trustworthy and are not willing to extend EPC to it, however, it is less clear whether the other 
Ugandan activists are willing to, to some extent, extend EPC to Invisible Children. Extending EPC 
to Invisible Children is equal to find it trustworthy in its assessment in the Kony2012 campaign. 
Looking closer at the Ugandan activists’ utterance, they stated that even though they appreciate 
Invisible Children shining a light on their situation, they still raise concerned voices against the 
simple storytelling in the Kony2012 campaign which they understand as misunderstanding or a 
misinterpretation of the conflict. I will therefore argue that they do not find Invisible Children’s 
assessment of the conflict trustworthy, and therefore do not extent the EPC to its assessment of the 
Ugandan history in the Kony2012 campaign, despite their appreciation.   
According to Medina, credibility has an interactive nature; credibility judgments interrelate and 
are not always easily distinguishable or extricable from each other. She states, “Credibility never 
applies to subjects individually and in isolation from others, but always affects clusters of subjects 
in particular social networks and environments” (Medina 2011:18). Through Medina we can 
understand, that when the members and founders extend the EPC to each other they equally 
exclude extending EPC to the northern Ugandans, the critics, or other groups who holds a different 
epistemic understanding of the conflict in Uganda, because when they extend EPC to the founders 
assessment that P they understand this as truth or at least as a justified belief, why they cannot 
understand another contradictory assessment Q equally to be true or justified as it contradicts their 
first beliefs. 
This epistemic exclusion is not of an unjust character, if Invisible Children assessment that P is not 
founded on a harmful stereotypical understanding of the northern Ugandans. Likewise Invisible 
Children’s assessment is not stereotypical if Invisible Children is the only one having this view of 
the northern Ugandans, because, as we saw above, epistemic injustice is not founded on a single 
testimony but has to ‘track’ the stereotypical group.  
As we saw in section 4.4 Invisible Children has been quite successful in its prognostic framing, 
spreading its advocacy through social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, 
starring in high profiled TV show and series such as Oprah and Veronica Mars, and having an 
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influence in president Obama passing the “Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern 
Uganda Recovery Act”. When these different individuals are advocating on behalf of Invisible 
Children, then, we must expect that they understand Invisible Children’s assessment P as justified 
and therefore extend EPC to it. In doing this, they also assign a level of credibility to it that is 
disproportionate (because Invisible Children is not trustworthy). According to Medina, this can 
have some unfortunate consequences. She argues that by assigning a level of credibility that is not 
proportionate to the epistemic credentials shown by the speaker, the excessive attribution does a 
disservice to everybody involved: to the speaker by letting him get away with things, and to 
everybody else by leaving a crucial aspect out of the interaction (Medina 2011:18-19). Thus by 
uncritical distributing excessive credibility to Invisible Children’s assessment in the Kony2012 
campaign they are also excluding crucial aspects of Ugandan history. 
5.3.3 Stereotypical epistemic exclusion  
We can now understand why the Ugandans have a missing voice in the Kony2012 campaign, but in 
order for this to be an expression of epistemic injustice, we need to investigate whether this 
credibility deficit is associated with false stereotypical identity-prejudice. In order to make this 
investigation I will look at Invisible Children’s collective action frame from Chapter 4. Through 
Snow and Benford we understood the collective action frame as a way for Invisible Children to 
construct meaning for action, and that the action frame simplified and condensed “the world out 
there” according to the campaign and to the target population’s cultural environment. Invisible 
Children thereby uses the action frame to advocate meaning for action through its framing of 
information which fits to the target audiences cultural understanding. 
The diagnostic injustice frame in section 4.3, is an understanding of the northern Ugandans as 
poor victims who needs to be saved from the evil Joseph Kony by Invisible Children. To this we 
need to ask whether the injustice framing is just an expression of Invisible Children’s 
understanding of the Ugandans or whether it is a general understanding of Africans. 
Benford and Snow state that “A plethora of studies call attention to the ways in which movements 
identify “victims” of a given injustice and amplifying their victimization.” (Benford&Snow 
2000:615). To this they add, “injustice frames are commonplace” (Benford&Snow 2000:615), thus 
such victimizing injustices frames are normal practices and not just an expression of Invisible 
Children’s stereotypical understanding. Additionally through Plewes and Stuart (2007) we can 
understand that it is not only Invisible Children who holds this understanding of Ugandans or 
more general Africans as victims. Bonny Ibhawoh, an assistant professor of history in Ontario sees 
the same understanding with his students, when he ask them what comes to mind when thinking 
about Africa, he always get same the answers, “Tarzan, (king of the jungle); famines and starving 
Kony	  2012	  –	  Knowledge	  and	  Responsibility	  in	  Development	  Campaigns	  	  
68	  	  
children; wars and conflicts; dictators and corrupt governments; slaves and slavery” 
(Plewes&Stuart 2007:25). Plewes and Stuart argue that, “These images portray people as helpless 
victims, dependent, and unable to take action; they convey a sense that development problems can 
only be solved by Northern charity” (Plewes&Stuart 2007:24). They refer to this as “pornography 
of charity” and argue that it can have a serious negative impact on Africa’s possibilities for 
development. Thus it seems therefore safe to argue that Invisible Children’s framing of injustice in 
the Kony2012 campaign is representative of the overall framing of victims in Africa.57 Epistemic 
agents who assign credibility to Invisible Children also hold the understanding that Invisible 
Children can, and should save the poor victimized Ugandans. Additionally the Ugandan bloggers 
response to Invisible Children can be understood as rejected Invisible Children’s framing of them 
as poor voiceless victims, asking them to respect their agency. 
Based on these arguments, and given the heavy critique against this aspect I will argue that 
Invisible Children understands the northern Ugandans through a stereotype based on unreliable 
prejudice. This stereotypical view with false negative prejudice of the northern Ugandans (an 
Africans in general) as helpless victims is generated and supported by Invisible Children and the 
agents who distribute credibility to it. I will therefore argue that the northern Ugandans are 
experiencing epistemic injustice by Invisible Children. 
Our first assumption in this chapter was that Invisible Children is benevolent and only have good 
intentions. Looking at the movement’s advocacy, its only goal is to help the northern Ugandans by 
bringing Kony to justice. It therefore seems strange that it would build its campaign upon harmful 
unreliable prejudice. According to Fricker, prejudices are difficult to detect especially for the one 
who holds them. Fricker states, “The idea is rather that prejudice will tend surreptitiously to inflate 
or deflate the credibility afforded the speaker, and sometimes this will be sufficient to cross the 
threshold for belief or acceptance so that the hearer’s prejudice causes him to miss out on a piece of 
knowledge” (Fricker 2007:17). She adds, “Certainly we may sometimes perpetrate testimonial 
injustice because of our beliefs (…) we may very frequently do it in spite of them” (Fricker 
2007:36). To illustrate this, Fricker gives an example with a boy, Solomon who lives in a small 
isolated farming community who in general believe that women are not half as competent as men 
in relation to abstract thinking. He had never met a woman who went in for abstract thinking, but 
met men of this sort. In this situation the boy could not be accused of any unreliable prejudice. But 
now he goes off to the university, where he studies alongside able women. Then Fricker argues, “If 
it does not shift the belief, however, then the beliefs is revealed as irrational, and moreover as a 
prejudice: the stubbornness of Solomon’s belief in the face of manifest counter-evidence would at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This argument is further developed throughout Chapter 6. 
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once reveal him as both epistemically and ethically flawed” (Fricker 2007:34). Thus we may have 
excused Invisible Children’s unreliable prejudice if it had not been confronted with evidence that 
contradicted it. But as we have seen in the previous chapters, Invisible Children has. Additionally 
when advocating on behalf of others, as I have argued earlier, Invisible Children has a greater 
responsibility for having true beliefs not built on unreliable prejudice against those it is advocating 
on behalf of. In doing this, Fricker argues, it is ethically flawed. 
We could imagine, though, that Invisible Children would argue that it was not itself who holds this 
prejudice, and that it was just an expression its of framing meaning for action. In this scenario I 
would still argue, that Invisible Children’s framing of information is ethically flawed as it creates 
and stimulate unreliable stereotypes which its members and other who find Invisible Children 
trustworthy understands as true. Thus this stereotypical understanding of the northern Ugandans 
becomes an expression of justified beliefs among the supporters of Invisible Children.  
Implications 
This stereotypical generalization has some serious implications for the northern Ugandans as 
epistemic agents. Fricker argues that when a person is being subject to epistemic injustice through 
her stereotype, it harms her in a primary and secondary way. 
The primary harm is that the subject is wronged in her capacity as a knower, according to Fricker, 
this is in accordance to being wronged in a capacity essential to human value. Fricker states, “The 
fact that the primary injustice involves insults to someone in respect of a capacity essential to 
human value lends even its least harmful instances a symbolic power that adds a layer of harm of 
its own: the epistemic wrong bear a social meaning to the effect that the subject is less than fully 
human” (Fricker 2011:32). Fricker argues that this dehumanizing, if it is expressed before others, 
can cause a profound humiliation. We can understand this humiliation, as what the northern 
Ugandans bloggers are reacting to in section 4.6.2 with statement like “it’s a slap in the face” and 
“you shouldn’t be telling my story if you don’t believe that I also have the power to change what is 
going on”.  
The secondary harm is related to how epistemic injustice can have a wide-ranging of negative 
impacts on a person’s life. The purely epistemic consequence is, as I have argued above, that the 
agent who receives testimonial injustice may lose confidence in her epistemic agency in general. 
These views are exactly what the Ugandan bloggers are reacting on and against - refusing to be 
seen as voiceless victims, not having any say or power to change their situation. Thus these blog-
posts can be understood as an effort to get their epistemic agency and assessment about their own 
history respected. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
In this Chapter I discussed whether the framing of information in the Kony2012 campaign is 
understandable as knowledge, and whether the diagnostic injustice framing of the northern 
Ugandans as helpless victims is an expression of epistemic injustice towards them. 
Through Daukas epistemic framework of trustworthiness, I discussed whether we could assign 
trust to the epistemic assessments made by the founders, the members, and the roadies of Invisible 
Children. Looking at the founders’ testimonies it became clear that they had a too high degree of 
self-confidence in their epistemic character which is keeping them from making the further 
necessary epistemic investigation to get a justified understanding of the history of Uganda. 
However, the founders’ goal with the collective action frame is not to get a holistic, epistemic 
understanding of the history of Uganda, but to create awareness to motivate actions, but this could 
not justify the lack of information in the Kony2012 campaign. However, we can question whether 
promoting more good and reducing harm to the northern Ugandans is more important than 
epistemic trustworthiness and whether such goal can excuse Invisible Children’s epistemic 
behaviour. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
When the members and the roadies extended EPC to the founders’ assessment in the Kony2012 
campaign they equally assigned confidence in the founders’ epistemic trustworthiness. Through 
Daukas, we understood that in order for the members and roadies to be epistemic trustworthy that 
confidence needed to be warranted. However, because the founders assessment was not 
trustworthy, and because the members and roadies easily, on account of the heavy criticism, could 
have sought additional information, they are also epistemic untrustworthy in their extension of 
EPC to the founders testimonies in the Kony2012 campaign.  
Lastly, I argued that Invisible Children’s framing of meaning of action is founded on an unreliable 
stereotypical prejudice towards the northern Ugandan, understanding them only as innocent 
victims. This has some unfortunate implications as such prejudice wrongs the northern Ugandans 
in their capacity as knowers which, according to Fricker, equals being wronged in a capacity 
essential to human value. Additionally, we could understand the Ugandans bloggers testimony 
from section 4.6.2 as a critic towards this epistemic injustice. This implication will further 
discussed in Chapter 6.
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6. Responsibility 
In this chapter I will discuss the implications of Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action 
in the Kony2012 campaign, and the responsibility it has for these. This is done to answer the last 
part of the main research question: in which way can Invisible Children be held responsible for the 
implication of such framings? 
I will start the discussion by summing up from the previous chapters, bringing responsibility into 
context with the central questions I found during the analysis in the thesis. Then I will discuss how 
we can hold Invisible Children responsible for the implications of its framing. This is done by first 
distinguishing between three concepts of responsibility: outcome, remedial and epistemic 
responsibilities, through Lorraine Code (1987) Epistemic Responsibility and David Miller (2007) 
National responsibility and Global Justice, and afterwards by discussing how Invisible Children 
can be held responsible for the implications of its framing of meaning for action in its Kony2012 
campaign.  
6.1 A feeling of responsibility  
Returning to the first meeting with the members’ collective identity and shared emotions in 
Chapter 3, and remembering my own personal feeling when I first watched the Kony2012 video, I, 
as the members, experienced a complex bundle of emotions. The first emotion was sympathy with 
the northern Ugandans and feeling an obligation to do something. According to David Miller 
(2007) we can understand such people as the northern Ugandans, as being below some absolute 
line of poverty and suffering that we tend to recognise. Furthermore, the harm they are suffering 
has not come from the hand of nature, but directly or indirectly from other human beings – this 
fact gives room for not only feeling sympathy but also anger. Anger at the people who have done 
this or who have let it happen to the northern Ugandans, questioning: why is this happening? 
What is producing this misery, and what should we be doing about it? (Miller 2007:2). 
In Chapter 3, I found that Invisible Children has been very successful in creating collective 
identities and emotions among its members based on these kinds of feelings and reflections. In 
Chapter 4, I analysed how Invisible Children frames meaning for action in the Kony2012 
campaign. Through the component diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing I analysed 
how Invisible Children is framing these feelings as questions of responsibility: Invisible Children is 
using injustice framing to showcase the victimhood of the northern Ugandans, Kony as the evil 
who caused the harm, and itself as the hero who can save them through leveraging pre-selected US 
based celebrities, and politicians on social media platforms. Additionally, in Chapter 4 we saw that 
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Invisible Children emphasizes moral cosmopolitical values of universalism and benevolence to give 
its members a feeling of a global responsibility to act. This global responsibility is based on 
sympathy for the victim and anger towards Kony and the LRA, who Invisible Children blame for all 
the northern Ugandan’s suffering. This frame obliterates all other emotions and gives a simplistic 
response to remedy the northern Ugandan’s suffering. Additionally it argues that everyone who 
encounters the Kony2012 campaign can and should remove the cause of the northern Ugandan’s 
suffering, namely Kony, by engaging with Invisible Children. 
Miller argues that when we respond to people caught up in atrocities, we should find ourselves 
pulling in two different directions, “On one side, we are inclined to see them simply as victims, 
people in other words to whom things as happened that they are powerless to resist. Our concern is 
with what has been done to them, with the deprivation and suffering that they have to bear. On the 
other side, we are also inclined to see them as agents, as people who make choices that have 
implications either for themselves or for others” (Miller 2007:5). According to Miller, we ask 
questions of responsibility when we ask whether the deprivation and suffering are self-inflicted, 
inflicted by others, or caused in some other way (Miller 2007:5).  
In the following section I will present the three components of responsibility that I will use to 
discuss whether and how Invisible Children is responsible for the implications of its framing of 
meaning for action in the Komy2012 campaign.  
6.2 Outcome, Remedial and Epistemic Responsibility  
In this section I will explain the three different responsibility components I use to discuss whether 
and how Invisible Children is responsible for its framing of meaning for action. These are based 
upon David Miller (2007) and Lorraine Code (1987) concepts of responsibility. 
A traditional agent focused58 moral responsibility holds three elements: 1) individualism, human 
beings are primary bearers of responsibility, 2) distinction between positive and negative duties, 
including an understanding that it is worse to inflict directly harm than to inflict indirectly harm, 
or fail to prevent it, and 3) importance is attributed to special obligations such as family and 
friends (Moore 2008:507). Additionally, Miller distinguishes between two primary forms of 
responsibility: 1) Outcome responsibility, the responsibility we bear for our actions and decisions, 
and 2) Remedial responsibility, the responsibility we have to aid those in need. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Miller focuses his theory of responsibility on institutional or state responsibility, hence collective responsibility, 
however Miller’s point of departure is discussing his distinction of responsibly from an agency point of view which I will 
focus on.  
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Code’s theoretical framework of epistemic responsibility focuses on which epistemic beliefs we are 
responsible for making. I will use Code’s theoretical framework to argue that epistemic responsible 
is a part of outcome responsibility as our actions and decisions are based on our epistemic inquiry. 
This gives Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action a central focus in this analysis 
because this meaning-making is epistemic matters, as shown in Chapter 5. 
In addition to the distinction between remedial and outcome responsibility, Miller distinguishes 
between two notions of responsibility: 1) identifying responsibility is a matter of seeing who, if 
anybody, meets the conditions for being responsible, and 2) assigning responsibility involves a 
decision to attach certain costs or benefits to an agent, whether or not the relevant condition is 
fulfilled (Miller 2007:84), thus assigning a responsibility to “make things right”, even though it was 
not necessarily her fault it went wrong.  
We can understand Invisible Children’s aim as assigning remedial responsibility to itself and 
everyone who encounters the campaign to relieve the northern Ugandans of their suffering, and the 
aim of this chapter as identifying Invisible Children’s outcome responsibility for its framing of 
meaning for action in its Kony2012 campaign. 
I will start the discussion by looking at outcome responsibility, and investigate in which ways 
Invisible Children can be outcome responsible for its actions and epistemic inquiry in the 
Kony2012 campaign. In order to make this discussion, I will show how epistemic and outcome 
responsibility is interlinked, but need to be assessed individually. Afterwards I will look at remedial 
responsibility, and how Invisible Children uses this understanding of responsibility in its advocacy. 
This will lead to a discussion of the implications of Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for 
action, and what kind responsibility Invisible Children has for these implications.  
6.2.1 The responsibility of beliefs  
This sections focuses on the how outcome and epistemic responsibility is interlinked but still need 
to be assessed individually, this because I want to distinguish between Invisible Children’s 
epistemic responsibility in its framing of meaning for actions, and the responsibility it has for the 
outcome of such framings - discussing Invisible Children’s responsibility in both aspects. 
According to Lorraine Code (1987) it is difficult to distinguish between epistemic and moral59 
responsibility because, “knowing well, preserving an appropriate degree of objectivity, thinking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Miller distinguishes between moral and outcome responsibility, as he argues that outcome responsibility is a 
prerequisite for being morally responsible. If the outcome of an action is connected to any kind of obligation, we are 
morally responsible for the outcome and can be assigned moral praise or blame. When Invisible Children takes upon 
itself to remedy the situation for the northern Ugandans it accepts a moral obligation and can be blamed or praised for its 
actions. I will therefore not distinguish between the two concepts of responsibility.  
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clearly, and being epistemically responsible are, in fact, moral matters. But they are not just moral 
matters; nor can they, as moral matters, be wholly subsumed under standard modes of ethical 
discussion” (Code 1987:68).  
Code argues that moral matters have a central epistemic core, in the sense that when a moral 
judgment is made two part of the related context must be assessed: the way the situation is 
apprehended, and the way the action is performed as a result of the former. Thus Code argues that 
the former is a matter for epistemological assessment and the latter can, through Miller, be 
understood as outcome responsibility - the former is related to Invisible Children’s diagnostic 
framing in section 4.3 and the latter is related to the implications this framing has on the northern 
Ugandans. The moral dimension of the situation is crucially dependent upon the epistemic 
component, as it underlines the choice of action (Code 1987:69).60  
To demonstrate the link between outcome and epistemic responsibility, Code gives an interesting 
example of a ship-owner: an owner of an unseaworthy ship had convinced himself that his ship was 
in fact seaworthy by selecting, emphasising, and ignoring evidence until he could honestly claim to 
believe in its seaworthiness. When he sent the ship to sea it went down. Code argues, that we can 
obviously state that he had no right or that he was epistemically irresponsible in believing the 
evidence on which he based his beliefs and performed his actions, no matter the outcome. If the 
incidence had resulted in the loss of life, we could state that, on consequential outcomes alone, the 
situation called for purely moral pronouncement. Thus Code argues that it is because of his 
epistemic irresponsible behaviour that the ship-owner was outcome responsible for his actions. We 
can therefore separate the epistemic and outcome responsibility, where the epistemic strands of 
the situation can and should be evaluated in its own terms as it function as the basis for the chosen 
action (Code 1987:72-73).  
The example is comparable to Invisible Children’s Kony2012 campaign. Within the framing of 
meaning for action is an understanding of information framing where the social movement select, 
emphasise, and punctuate certain information and interpret local testimonies to fit a chosen action 
frame, hence it is Invisible Children’s epistemic assessment in the framing of information that 
grounds its advocacy, and thereby its action. It is therefore important to assess whether Invisible 
Children can be held responsible for the epistemic processes of framing meaning for action and for 
the implications this framing has created.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 According to Code, the standard approach to ethical questions proceed from the tactic assumption that that all moral 
agents perceive and understand situations in precisely the same way which creates a confusion that tends to obscure a 
complexity that must be acknowledged. She argues, that there is little reason to assume such commonality, “Human 
intellects and sensibilities are not blank, mass-produced (and hence identical) screens upon which situations simply 
register in exactly the same way. Different cognitive capacities and epistemic circumstances create situations where 
experiences is structured, and hence the world is known, quite differently from one cognitive agent to another” (Code 
1987:69). 
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I will discuss the epistemic, outcome and remedial responsibility separately. First I introduce 
outcome responsibility and then discuss in which aspects Invisible Children can be outcome 
responsible 
6.2.2 Outcome responsibility 
In this section I will discuss whether and how Invisible Children is responsible for the outcomes of 
the implications its framing of meaning for action has created. First I will elaborate further on the 
concept of outcome responsibility which will be used in the discussions in the following sections.  
According to Miller, being outcome responsible has a causal component, meaning that the agent 
must have contributed to producing the outcome of a given situation61. Thus what is required to be 
outcome responsible for a situation is a foreseeable connection between the action and the result. 
This also means that the causal chain of action, the action which lead to a result which again led to 
another result, matters for attribution of responsibilities; as the chain becomes longer the 
responsibility dissipates. (Miller 2007:88). Additionally, an agent cannot claim outcome 
responsibility for a good but flukey result, because, Miller argues, there has to be a connection 
between my personal capacities and the result for outcome responsibility to obtain. In case of 
actions creating bad results, the criterion for outcome responsibility is that the result must be one 
that a person with normal capacities could have avoided producing (Miller 2007:88,96), we would 
therefore expect a person to be aware of her shortcomings and capacities in the actions that the 
agent takes. A natural requirement for an agent to be outcome responsible for an action is therefore 
that the agent is able to foresee the consequences of what she did or failed to do (Miller 2007:96). 
As Miller states, ”in interpreting this condition we have a to steer a mid-course between, on the one 
hand, asking what the particular person in question could have foreseen, given his actual capacities 
and state of mind, and on the other asking what was foreseeable in principle, given complete 
knowledge of the circumstances in which the action occurred” (Miller 2007:96).  
In order to discuss Invisible Children’s outcome responsibility for the implications of its framing of 
meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign, I investigate whether the implications was 
predictable, thus whether Invisible Children could foresee that the actions and decisions it 
undertook was likely to have the consequences that it did. 
In Chapter 5, I argued that the founders of Invisible Children are too confident in their epistemic 
assessment of the history of northern Uganda. Additionally in section 5.3.3 we saw that Invisible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Even though there is a close relation between outcome and causal responsibility, Miller still distinguishes between the 
two, as causal responsibility is invoked when a situation occurs, and we ask why and what the cause of this situation was, 
thus human agency has no special status in causal responsibility (Miller 2007:86-87). I will not, however, go into this 
discussion.  
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Children’s injustice framing is built upon unreliable stereotypical prejudice which can be very hard 
to detect as they may inflate surreptitiously in spite of our epistemic intentions. This may be used 
as argument to state that Invisible Children could not have foreseen the implications of its framing 
as it is not consciously aware of the prejudice that it holds against the northern Ugandans. 
However, taking the heavy amount of criticism into account and considering the consequence that 
is at stake in its framing it demands for a high degree of confidence. And as we saw in section 5.2, 
we would expect Invisible Children to acknowledge the criticism against it and try to alter its 
epistemic beliefs to get a more profound understanding of the history of northern Uganda.  
To this Miller states, that we are expected to be aware of our shortcomings which is why Invisible 
Children is expected to challenge its prejudice towards the northern Ugandans or avoid situation 
where such prejudice may create harm. Thus I will argue that Invisible Children could, or should 
have foreseen the implications of its framing of meaning of action and therefore is outcome 
responsible for them. 
However, there are cases where we want to relieve an agent of the outcome responsibility. To this 
Miller gives several examples, most interesting for us is the example of manipulation. Cases of 
manipulation entail a person A inducing B to do something she would not otherwise have done by 
distorting B’s process of decision. Miller gives three simple examples of this: B is acting on false 
information from A, A planting reasons for a certain action in B’s head, or A persuading B to do 
something she might not otherwise have done (Miller 2007:92). 
According to Moore (2012) the nature of social movement’s advocacy can be understood as 
manipulation62, this because social movements knowingly frame information to fit a certain line of 
action. Social movements use such framing of meaning for action to persuade or plant certain 
raisons for specific actions that directs the members’ “call to arms”. We can therefore question 
whether the founders are manipulating the members of Invisible Children. 
In cases of manipulation the unknowing actor B’s control and responsibility passes to the 
manipulator A. Thus if this is the case with invisible Children’s members and founders, we can 
excuse the members outcome responsibility. However, to escape responsibility B must meet certain 
standards: she must not be unusually gullible, for instance. Additionally, the responsibility can 
pass back to B if she was responsible for getting into the situation where she is manipulated. Even 
though the members of Invisible Children experience some sort of manipulation through the 
framing of meaning for action, they are not relieved of their outcome responsibility because they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62  As Moore states, “By its very nature, advocacy is meant to manipulate (…) often, as in Kony2012, advocates are trying 
to create popular support to pressure policymakers to enact a specific agenda” (Moore 2012:101).  
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themselves has chosen to get involved with Invisible Children. Additionally we saw in Section 5.2.1, 
the members of Invisible Children should have made a more thorough epistemic inquiry of 
Invisible Children’s framing of the history of Uganda before extending EPC to them.  
Summing up, Invisible Children is outcome responsible for the implication of the framing of 
meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign. Additional the members could not be relieved of 
their outcome responsibility, even though the founders’ advocacy could be understood as a form of 
manipulation. 
We now turn to questions of epistemic responsibility and whether Invisible Children is 
epistemically responsible for its framings in the Kony2012 campaign.  
6.2.3 Epistemic responsibility 
In this section, I will discuss how we can be responsible in our epistemic assessments, thus whether 
we can be held epistemically responsible for our beliefs. This is done to discuss whether and how 
Invisible Children can be held responsible for its epistemic assessments of the Ugandan history in 
the Kony2012 campaign on which it base its prognostic framing. 
Code argues that, “There is a considerable degree of freedom in knowledge; hence, an adequate 
explication of human knowledge must give scope and grant responsibility to subjective factors that 
structure the process of knowledge acquisition, while preserving an ideal of objectivity, of realism 
normatively construed” (Code 1987:77). Code draw on Michael Stocker (1982) to make this 
argumentation. She starts the discussion by arguing that, “Stocker makes a good, convincing case 
for his conclusion: “if we can be responsible and active for various sorts of interesting and 
important physical acts, we can be responsible for mental goings-on, including beliefs”” (Code 
1987:83).  
Opponents to this view use standard examples which states that we must ineluctably know its 
Friday simply because it is Friday. It cannot be a choice, so the notion that there could be a choice 
concerning knowledge and beliefs looks ludicrous. They further add that belief differ from action in 
that it cannot involve choice and therefore cannot be something for which we can be held 
responsible. This would mean that we are wholly passive in regard to our beliefs which is why no 
attribution of responsibility is warranted (Code 1987:84). 
Code argues for a middle position, stating that denying the active nature of a belief is misleading. 
According to Code this position glosses over procedures such as information gathering that led to 
belief formation, and fails to consider such acts as paying attention in assessing and judging the 
information. To this Code adds that, “No one would deny that people are responsible for these and 
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other activities that commonly lead to, contribute, to, or accompany beliefs. If belief is part of, or 
outcome of, any or all of these activities, it seems indefensible to deny that one can be held 
responsible for it” (Code 1987:85). Thus Invisible Children is, according to Code, epistemic 
responsible for its information gathering and beliefs formation, hence Invisible Children’s framing 
of meaning for action. As we saw in Chapter 5, the argument against seeing Invisible Children as an 
epistemically trustworthy agent was that it is too self-confident in its information assessing where 
it fails to realise other important aspect of the history of Uganda. Thus the discussion of Invisible 
Children’s trustworthiness is related to assessing and judging information of which it, according to 
Code, can be responsible.63 
Code gives an interesting example of the Flat Earth Society to demonstrate why behaving epistemic 
responsible is important. Code gives the example of a society who believes the earth is flat which, 
Code argues, may seem, prima facie, to be morally harmless both to the members and others. It 
would be conceivable that members of this society would be as morally good as the most 
demanding standards would require, however, they could still be judged epistemically 
irresponsible for their beliefs on the basis of insufficient and contradictory evidence, on which they 
are claiming knowledge. In this aspect they are not taking available evidence sufficiently into 
account and therefore not being epistemic responsible (Code 1987:73).  
Comparing this to Invisible Children, we can also understand it as a movement that, as I discussed 
in Chapter 5, holds specific knowledge or beliefs about the history of Uganda which I have analysed 
to be untrustworthy, and therefore epistemically irresponsible. However, without reflecting heavily 
on the means and tactics it uses to frame information in its campaigning, we could understand it as 
generally morally good, as it focus on moral cosmopolitical values of universalism and 
benevolence, understanding human beings as having a moral responsibility to help those in need. 
Thus at first glance we could understand Invisible Children’s campaigning as morally upright, 
assigning remedial responsibility to aid the Ugandans to itself, the members, as well as everyone 
else that encounters Invisible Children’s media.  
Code goes deeper into the example by stating that the Flat Earth Community’s irresponsible 
epistemic behaviour both has private and public implications. The private implication is that we 
may regard a flat-earth believer as an unreliable source of information because her epistemic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Code limits the domain of epistemic responsibility to the members performed in the acquisitions of beliefs, while 
denying that an ensuring belief falls within the domain of epistemic responsibility, she states: “clearly I am not 
responsible for being alive or being the age I am - but there are conditions for which I, just as clearly, am and have been 
active and responsible – for being a philosopher, for being a parent, for being bilingual.” (Code 1987:87). Code therefore 
concludes, that there is an element of freedom in both action and beliefs: “that we can sometimes choose when or what to 
believe; but often there is no choice.” (Code 1987:90).63 It is, however, not relevant for us to determine exactly which 
beliefs we can be responsible for, because, as we have seen above, we are responsible in our epistemic behaviour 
regarding information gathering and assessment on which we build beliefs. 
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convictions make us hesitate to understand her as trustworthy which may affect her intellectual 
character, as we have seen in Chapter 5. More interesting for us, however, is the public implication. 
Code states that it would pose both moral and epistemic concern if a flat-earth believer was in a 
position to grant or withhold funds for space research (Code 1987:75), as a flat-earth believer, 
because of her irresponsible belief’s, would create morally culpable judgements in relation to her 
position as she would grant the funds based on epistemically irresponsible judgements.  
Turning back to the case of Invisible Children, then, we can raise moral concern regarding its 
position as development and advocacy actors because it acts on the basis of epistemically 
irresponsible beliefs. Code states that the highest degree of epistemic irresponsibility attaches to 
acts that is led by unwarranted and unjustifiable beliefs. Meaning people who are wont to believe 
things for which the evidence is scanty or who systematically dwell upon evidence that support an 
unreliable proposition and avoid exposure to evidence that might put them in doubt (Code 
1987:90). As we have seen in Chapter 5, this is comparable to Invisible Children’s epistemic 
behaviour and I can therefore argue that Invisible Children is epistemically irresponsible in its 
framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign.  
However, Code argues, that despite the centrality of having justified beliefs for human wellbeing, 
epistemic claims are not absolute nor are epistemic duties sternly uncompromising. She states, “All 
else being equal, it is better to know, but often, in human experience, all else is not equal. These 
moral and epistemic concerns, then, are nor perfectly distinct or distinguishable from one another” 
(Code 1987:70). To this Code adds that there can be situations where we need to believe in the 
value of a task or a project which may justify a redirecting of epistemic practice. Such practices 
could not count as epistemic justifications, however, one could argue that prudential, practical, or 
moral considerations override epistemic ones if the former are judged more pressing (Code 
1987:70). Understanding the nature of social movements advocacy as manipulation and accepting 
it as an essential element of how social movements frame meaning for action to make a morally 
problematic situation entail less harm and more good, then, one could argue that doing good is 
more pressing than behaving epistemically responsible. This is in fact what Invisible Children is 
arguing by stating that “nuances paralyze us” and that “action is better than no action” as we saw in 
section 4.6.1.  
Thus we need to look at remedial responsibility, asking whether Invisible Children is neglecting 
their epistemic responsibility in favour of a remedial responsibility and thereby promotes more 
good than harm to the northern Ugandans in the Kony2012 campaign. If this is the case, it could 
excuse its irresponsible epistemic behaviour. 
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6.2.4 Remedial responsibility 
In section I will discuss David Miller’s remedial responsibility in relation to Invisible Children’s 
advocacy. According to Miller, remedial responsibility applies when we encounter a situation in 
need of remedy. The need of remedy is owed to a person or a group who are unjustifiably deprived 
in a way that makes them fall below some threshold in terms of material resources, or that are in 
danger or distress, as with the northern Ugandans. Miller defines remedial responsibility as: “to 
have a special responsibility, either individually or along with others, to remedy the position of the 
deprived or suffering people, one that is not equally shared with all agents; and to be liable to 
sanction (blame, punishment, etc.) if the responsibility is not discharged” (Miller 2007:99). Thus, 
central to remedial responsibility is that we find it morally unacceptable that a deprived person is 
simply left to suffer which is why some capable agent or agents have or are given an obligation to 
act in way that remedies the situation. 
When looking at a case of remedial responsibility such as with the northern Ugandans, then, Miller 
would argue, that no one is formally assigned the responsibility to aid them from the atrocities 
conducted by Kony64, this because Kony himself is outcome responsible which Invisible Children 
underlines in its diagnostic framing. In this perception, I can argue, through Miller, that Kony also 
have a remedial responsibility to remedy the situation for the northern Ugandans. However, 
Invisible Children is not advocating for this point, as it is not trying to make Kony act in certain 
ways, it is simply trying to capture him. In this perspective Invisible Children deprives Kony from 
his remedial responsibility, and thereby removes his agency, only making him an object of evil. 
Thus, as we have seen clear examples of in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, Invisible Children is advocating 
us to take remedial responsible to end the suffering of northern Ugandans by framing them as 
victims, Kony as evil, and themselves as aiding heroes.  
In Millers understanding of remedial responsibility we have an obligation to aid the northern 
Ugandans, even though we have not actively violated their rights, “Given that those who are 
suffering the effects of the regime are not themselves responsible for its existence, it seems that 
outsiders do have responsibilities in practice presents towards them” (Miller 2007:257). If we do 
not respond to this obligation, we are infringing on the rights of the northern Ugandans. Thus 
Invisible Children is right in assigning remedial responsibility to itself because it is our moral 
obligations to help does in need. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 As seen in the introduction, we could also assign outcome responsibility to the Ugandan government and various other 
rebel groups, who therefore also would have a responsibility to remedy the situation for the northern Ugandans. But to 
not confuse the line of argument, and to keep Invisible Children’s framing in focus, I will only refer to Kony in this 
discussion of assigning responsibility.  
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Invisible Children is working within a development sphere focussing on an unjust situation and 
advocating for justice to the northern Ugandans, as seen in section 4.5. According to Carens (2013) 
all organisation or movements working within development have these kind of ethical concerns as 
their primary goals, he states, ”Whatever the specific formulation of their mission – social justice, 
human right, and so on – their raison d’être is the promotion of some moral good” (Carens 
2013:257). The thesis’ investigation of Invisible Children’s advocacy has shown that Invisible 
Children holds the same kind of ethical goal; foster peace to the northern Ugandan by capturing 
Kony and bringing him to justice.  
According to Thomas Pogge (2013) we, when giving contributions to development organisation or 
social movements such as Invisible Children, assign trust to them - we trust that Invisible Children 
has developed carefully formulated moral priorities governing how the collected fundraising is 
spent, we trust that Invisible Children has produced the information it needs to prioritise well in its 
work, and we trust Invisible Children do this efficiently (Pogge 2013:221). This trust can be 
understood as expecting the outcomes of Invisible Children’s action discharge our remedial 
responsibilities. In this way, the contributors are letting Invisible Children handle their remedially 
responsibility to the northern Ugandans under the assumptions that Invisible Children is a morally 
good cosmopolitical actor, expecting its initiatives to promote more good and less harm for the 
northern Ugandans.  
When Invisible Children take this remedial responsibility to the northern Ugandans upon itself, it 
also becomes outcome responsible for the consequences of its actions in trying to remedy the 
situation for the northern Ugandans through its framing of meaning for action. The thesis’ 
investigation of Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action has raised important questions 
of Invisible Children’s advocacy and which implications it brings. I can therefore question whether 
Invisible Children’s advocacy for the northern Ugandans promotes more good and less harm.  
In the following section I will further investigate these implications, while discussing how Invisible 
Children can be identified as outcome responsibility and to what extent Invisible Children can be 
assigned outcome responsibility for the consequences of its actions and beliefs.   
6.3 Framing stereotypes and the responsibility that follows 
In this section I will discuss the implications of Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action 
in the Kon2012 campaign found in Chapter 4 and 5 in relation to Miller and Code’s concepts of 
responsibility. This is done to investigate whether Invisible Children is promoting more good than 
harm to the northern Ugandans in its framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign.  
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As we saw in Chapter 4, Invisible Children is framing the Kony2012 campaign through a simplistic 
storyline focusing on the unjust situation of the victims, the children of northern Uganda, and the 
responsible enemy, Kony. Invisible Children portrays the children’s fear and suffering of the child-
abduction by Joseph Kony, through Jacob testimony in section 4.3, framing them as the innocent 
victims that everyone watching should help safe by engaging with Invisible Children. A member 
from Resolve, another organisation who focus on northern Uganda, comment on the Invisible 
Children’s storyline, “they have played that up very effectively in creating a storyline that is purely 
humanitarian and using the most vulnerable possible characters in that storyline, you know they’ve 
mainly attracted kids, justifiably, I mean, you have to have an angle to tap people’s attention 
initially but they have done it in a way that is completely apolitical” (Finnegan 2011:93).  
In section 5.3, I have argued that this stereotypical framing of the northern Ugandans has some 
unfortunate fundamental epistemic implications. However, looking closer at development 
campaigns and the media surrounding it, it becomes evident that injustice framing is normal, and 
some will even argue, necessary to get the message out. According to Joseph Davis (2005) 
constructionist scholars of social problems argue that the construction of victim frame is shaped by 
public expectation and necessities. Davis states, “they maintain that gaining public recognition of a 
social problem requires claim-making to demonstrate harm. Gaining public sympathy and help for 
those putatively injured requires establishing their moral goodness, as a person innocent of any 
responsibilities or fault for the harm suffered” (Davis 2005:530). This is in line with Miller’s 
understanding of remedial responsibility, as it is human beings who have no fault in the 
experienced harm to whom we have the strongest remedial obligation. 
According to Simon Cottle and David Nolan (2007) the civil society platform is crowded with 
NGO’s and social movements which inevitably produces a sense of competition and the need to 
raise the organizational profile in the media whenever possible, as the National Communications 
Manager of the Red Cross Australia states, “When it all boils down, we’re basically all trying to do 
the same thing. But we are aware that we’re all competing for the same dollar. Really, you can’t do 
what we need to do without funding” (Cottle&Nolan 2007:865). Thus the conflict in simple terms 
can help raise awareness and media attention which Invisible Children may find necessary in the 
competitive field of international development campaigns. To this Brough adds that because of the 
high level of dependability on fundraising, those responsible for the visual representation in 
campaigning often find themselves in a double bind, juggling the fiscal pressure to frame 
beneficiaries as helpless victims in order to raise funds for programs that aim to empower these 
very same beneficiaries (Brough 2012:179), Keck and Sikkink underlined the same point in section 
4.4.1, they argued that there was a conflict between dramatic pictures and credible information. 
Brough states, “Maintaining the dignity of beneficiaries while exploiting the representation of their 
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very disempowerment is one of the primary discursive struggles within the sector, waged largely 
through visual representation” (Brough 2012:179).  
We can now understand why Invisible Children chose to simplistically frame the northern 
Ugandans as innocent victims, it is however, not clear whether this argumentation for Invisible 
Children’s framing of meaning for action can remove the moral blameworthy element in its 
epistemic irresponsible behaviour and whether it fulfil the moral duty of remedy it has taken upon 
itself. To discuss this we need to have a general understanding of the implication of such framings 
in relation to outcome and remedial responsibility.  
6.3.1 Promoting more harm than good  
As shown above through Keck and Sikkink, and Brough, there is a conflict between exploiting the 
northern Ugandans representation through dramatic picturing while maintaining their dignity 
through credible information use. According to Miller, we need always to see human beings as both 
needy and vulnerable and as choosing agents. Miller states that, ”human beings cannot live decent, 
let alone flourishing lives unless they are given at least a minimum bundle of freedoms, 
opportunities, and resources (...) Where people lack these conditions, it seems that those who are 
better endowed have obligations of justice to help provide them. On the other hand, human beings 
are choosing agents who must take responsibility for their own lives” (Miller 2007:5-6). According 
to Miller, and as discussed in section 6.2.4, we have a remedial responsibility to help those in need 
to some basic resource, however, we should still understand these people as having a possibility for 
altering their lives, thus having outcome responsibility for their actions.  
Miller argues that in seeing human beings as victim, we understand them as people to whom things 
have happened that they are powerless to resist (Miller 2007:5), to this Miller adds, that if we do 
not understand victims both as needy and vulnerable human beings, and as responsible agents, 
then, we are denying them their agency to alter their lives (Miller 2007:6-7). Fricker agrees with 
this point, and argues that the epistemic injustice the northern Ugandans are experiencing due to 
Invisible Children’s framing is dehumanizing because being wrong in ones capacity as a knower is 
being wronged in an essential human value and essential to human wellbeing, seen in section 5.3.3. 
Likewise Moore adds to this point. He states that the missing dates in the footage of the Kony2012 
are problematic. He understands this as important because “dateless footage of a sobbing African 
child reinforces media stereotypes about Africa as a place of unending violence, static and 
senseless” (Moore 2012:94). Moore adds that the testimony of Jacob is not a timeless symbol of a 
terrible warlord, the story of the LRA has changed over time, and offering the illusion that Jacob’s 
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story is present skews the facts about the war in Uganda (Moore 2012:94). The missing dating of 
the footage in the Kony2012 video underlines the Ugandan as a stereotypical poor victim. 
As seen in section 6.2.2 Invisible Children is outcome responsible for the implication the framing 
of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign creates. As we saw in section 6.2.3 and in Chapter 
5, Invisible Children should have behaved more epistemic responsible in its epistemic assessment 
in the Kony2012, and that it is this epistemically irresponsibility in its framing of meaning which 
lays the groundwork for its action. Thus Invisible Children is outcome responsible for the 
implications the Kony2012 campaign enhances. Additionally, Invisible Children does not meet the 
requirement of the remedial responsibility it assigns itself. This because, Invisible Children has an 
obligation not to inflict additional harm to the northern Ugandans through its advocacy, but as we 
can see Invisible Children does that through its framing of unreliable stereotypes.65 As we have 
seen in section 4.6.1, Invisible Children’s counter-argument is that nuances paralyze us, and that 
any action to remedy the northern Ugandans situation is better than no action. Thus letting the 
complications of the Ugandan history be integrated in their framing of information would paralyze 
the movement’s act. 
However, remembering the distinction between positive and negative duties in section 6.2, it was 
worse to directly inflict harm, than to fail to prevent it. This understanding entails that it is the 
same type of harm (which is not the case), or that Invisible Children is inflicting more harm than 
good. To this it is important to add two aspect: 1) Invisible Children cannot justify its argument, 
because it could or should have foreseen the consequences of its framings, as seen in section 6.2.2, 
and have tried to ameliorate this by making further epistemic inquiry and thereby built its framing 
on justified belief, and being epistemically responsible. Thus in this perspective it is better not to 
have inflicted harm, as the harm could have been foreseen. 2) Invisible Children could have 
justified inflicting harm on the northern Ugandans, if it promoted considerably more good than 
harm. Let’s look at this second perspective.  
The danger of Invisible Children’s framing is, according to Finnegan, that mobilized Western 
activists may act on behalf of their African counterparts without the comprehensive understanding 
that is needed to address the problems, or to address what their African counterparts desire to be 
done, which is why such actions may displace the effort of African activists (Finnegan 2011:195). To 
this Pogge adds that it seem paternalistic to insist that our effort to protect people must be guided 
by our own personal notion of harm or justice rather than theirs (Pogge 2013:227).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Through the criticism in section 4.6 Invisible Children could properly be assigned additional outcome responsibility for 
the proposed solution of a military intervention, and irresponsible use of economic resources, however, as I have not 
discussed this thoroughly I will not conclude on this.   
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As we have seen in section 4.4.2 Invisible Children’s and the Ugandan activists’ proposed solutions 
and desired next steps stands as complete opposites. Additionally we can understand the Ugandan 
bloggers and activist statements as asking Invisible Children to respect their agency. When 
Invisible Children is only focussing on its personal understanding of how to remedy the Ugandan 
suffering, it act paternalistically and displace the local efforts which again is denying the Ugandans 
their agency. Thus the stereotypical framing of victims additionally has the implications that it 
displaces the Ugandans own effort. Taking Pogge’s argument into account Invisible Children 
needed to take the northern Ugandans understanding of harm and injustice into account in its 
prognostic framings proposed solutions to the conflict.  
If Invisible Children had done this, it would have respected the Ugandans agency and been 
epistemic responsible in its framing as it would have integrated the northern Ugandans 
understanding of the conflict and proposed solutions to ending the suffering in its advocacy. 
Likewise it would also have made the northern Ugandans epistemically responsible for the framing 
of information and outcome responsible for the actions such framing would have resulted in.  
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed whether and how Invisible Children is responsible to its framing of 
meaning for action through the components: outcome, epistemic, and remedial responsibility. 
Through outcome responsibility we saw that Invisible Children is outcome responsible for its 
framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign, as it could or should have foreseen the 
implications of its framing, and if Invisible Children could not have foreseen these consequences 
on account of its unreliable stereotypical understandings of the northern Ugandans, it should have 
been aware of these shortcomings by taking the criticism towards the campaign seriously. 
Additionally we saw the members also are responsible, even though the framing of information was 
somewhat manipulative. However, because the members voluntarily chose to engage with Invisible 
Children, they are also outcome responsible for the implications of framing of meaning for action 
in the Kony2012 campaign. 
Through epistemic responsibility I argued, that we are epistemically responsible in activities such 
as information gathering, paying attention, making judgements etc. Thus Invisible Children has an 
epistemic responsibility in its framing of meaning for action because such framing is related to this 
kind of epistemic inquiry, and as seen in Chapter 5, it was not trustworthy is these assessment. I 
therefore conclude that Invisible Children is epistemic irresponsible in its framing of information. 
However, moral concerns can override the epistemic owns, if these where judged more pressing. 
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Thus I needed to investigate whether Invisible Children could be excused its epistemic 
irresponsible behaviour by preventing harm and promoting good to the northern Ugandans. 
This turned us to remedial responsibility. Through Miller, I argued that Invisible Children was 
right in taking the responsibility to remedy the situation for the northern Ugandan, because not 
responding to those in need and suffering would be a moral failure of respect. However, Invisible 
Children’s framing of meaning for action was not promoting more good than harm, as Invisible 
Children weakened the northern Ugandans agency framing them only as victims; therefore 
Invisible Children did not fulfil its remedial responsibility. According to Miller it is a failure of 
respect to ignore this agency, and in chapter 4 and 5 we saw that this failure of respect had some 
serious consequences for the northern Ugandans. I can therefore conclude that Invisible Children 
is morally culpable in the Kony2012 campaign, as its framing of meaning for action creates more 
harm than good for the northern Ugandans.   
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7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I will conclude on the main research question: How can Invisible Children’s 
success in motivating young people, and in framing meaning for action be explained? How can 
this framing of meaning for action be understood as knowledge? And in which way can Invisible 
Children be held responsible for the implications of such framing?  
The conclusion is based on the analyses and discussions made in this thesis. I will answer the main 
research question’s questions separately. Lastly, I will discuss which aspects of the thesis’ 
conclusions that can be generalised to including development campaigns in general. 
How can Invisible Children’s success in motivating young people, and in framing meaning for 
action be explained? 
Invisible Children’s media is naturally the most important aspect in motivating young people to get 
involved in the movement, as the media is often the members’ first encounter with Invisible 
Children. Invisible Children uses its media to create collective identities, shared emotions, and 
frame meaning for action through its collective action frame.  
Invisible Children has been very successful in creating collective identity and shared emotions 
among its members which is crucial for its success, as the collective identity and shared emotions 
function as a motivational factor for Invisible Children’s ‘call to arms’. Invisible Children’s easy, 
unchallenging recipes for action motivate the members to get involved and make them feel they 
have a responsibility to ’make a difference’. Invisible Children does an excellent job of showing 
each member that they are not just a number in the masses by ensuring them that they are part of 
something important, something that can make history. 
Invisible Children frames meaning for action through its collective action analysed through three 
components: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. Invisible Children is assigning 
blame and outcome responsibility for the war in Uganda to Joseph Kony through its injustice 
diagnostic frame. It frames Kony as an object of pure evil who is outcome responsible for the 
Ugandans’ suffering, the northern Ugandans as innocent victims to whom Invisible Children and 
everyone who encounter its media have a remedial responsibility to help out of their suffering, and 
itself as American heroes that have both an obligation and the abilities to remedy the situation for 
the northern Ugandans by capturing Kony and bring him to justice.  
Invisible Children advocates for a simplistic line of action to reach justice for the northern 
Ugandans through a military intervention. In this prognostic frame, the advocacy role of Invisible 
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Children’s members is primarily to leverage preselected celebrities and policymakers through 
social media platforms and collect funds through fundraising events. The prognostic framing 
underlines the no wave-making activism that synergise well with the members’ cultural 
understanding of the world as a good place. In this understanding of no-wave making activism, it 
becomes more important to do something than not to do anything in the face of the Ugandans’ 
suffering. 
Invisible Children uses its motivational frame to call its members to arms through two central 
values, universalism and benevolence which are an expression of moral cosmopolitanism. These 
values create a motivational feeling for action which I have analysed through four categories: 
making a difference, guilt, feeling special, and belonging. Invisible Children makes the members 
feel that they have an opportunity and a remedial responsibility to make a difference through 
creative fundraising events. Additionally, the members feel guilt because they have so much 
compared to the northern Ugandans. They also feel they belong to the Invisible Children 
community which sustains their commitment. Thus Invisible Children functions as a social outlet 
and a hip, young environment where the members feel they belong. 
How can this framing of meaning for action be understood as knowledge?  
The information in the Kony2012 campaign is built upon testimonial utterances from experts and 
upon personal stories. In our everyday practice as epistemic agents, it is natural for us to 
understand other’s testimonies as knowledge to which we assign different amounts of credibility 
and trust. When we assign trust and credibility, we engage in a stereotypical social categorisation 
where we normally understand testimonies from experts such as Ocampo to be trustworthy. Thus 
to analyse whether Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign is 
knowledge or justified belief, I analysed whether we could assign trust to Invisible Children’s 
assessment in the Kony2012 campaign and thereby whether we could understand the framing of 
information in the Kony2012 campaign as knowledge.  
Because of the heavy criticism of Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action in Kony2012, 
there is a lot at stake in Invisible Children’s epistemic assessments and thus a high degree of 
trustworthiness is required. This entails that Invisible Children has a well-founded epistemic 
character. Looking at the founders, it became clear that they had too high a degree of self-
confidence in their epistemic character which is keeping them from making the further, necessary 
epistemic investigation to get a justified understanding of the war in Uganda. When the members 
and the roadies extended the epistemic principle of charity to the founders’ assessment in the 
Kony2012 campaign, they equally assigned confidence to its epistemic trustworthiness. Because 
the founders’ assessment in the Kony2012 campaign was not trustworthy and because the 
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members and roadies easily, on account of the heavy criticism, could have sought additional 
information, they also become epistemically untrustworthy by assigning of trust to the founders.  
In which way can Invisible Children be held responsible for the implications of such framing? 
The two main criticisms of Invisible Children’s framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 
campaign was an oversimplification of the conflict, and that the campaign gives no agency to the 
northern Ugandans. In analysing these critiques in relation to Invisible Children’s framing of 
meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign, it became clear that the framing had some 
unfortunate implications to which we can hold Invisible Children epistemically, outcome and 
remedially responsible.  
Invisible Children behaves epistemically irresponsibly in its epistemic assessment in the Kony2012 
campaign as it is not trustworthy in its epistemic assessments. Invisible Children’s epistemic 
behaviour is based upon unreliable, stereotypical prejudice towards the northern Ugandans. Such 
prejudices wrong the northern Ugandans in their capacity as knowers which is equivalent to being 
wronged in an essential human value and human wellbeing. 
Invisible Children is outcome responsible for its framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 
campaign because it should or could have foreseen the problematic outcomes of its framing by 
taken the criticism towards it seriously, and by being aware of the shortcomings in its unreliable, 
stereotypical understanding of the northern Ugandans. The members cannot be excused their 
outcome responsibility even though the framing of information is somewhat manipulative, as the 
members themselves chose to engage in Invisible Children.  
Invisible Children is right in taking the responsibility to remedy the situation of the northern 
Ugandans, as we have a moral obligation to help those in need of our aid. However, Invisible 
Children is not behaving responsibly in its effort to remedy the situation for the northern 
Ugandans because it does not give any agency to the Ugandans in its campaigning and thereby 
disrespecting them as epistemic agents who have the potential to alter their own lives. Since 
Invisible Children is outcome responsible in the remedial responsibility it chose to take, it is 
therefore morally culpable in its framing of meaning for action in the Kony2012 campaign as its 
framing of meaning for action produced more harm than good for the northern Ugandans.  
7.1 Generalising the conclusion 
In this section, I will discuss which aspects of the conclusion that can be generalised to include 
development campaigns in general, mainly with focus on the responsibility that development 
campaigns have.  
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In Chapter 6.3, I argued that it was not only Invisible Children who used the injustice framing in its 
campaign and that there is a general conflict between exploiting the beneficiaries’ suffering to 
create dramatic pictures while maintaining their dignity through credible use of information. As 
the competition for funds increases, development campaigns become more prone to use 
victimising injustice framing to punctuate a moral cosmopolitanism understanding of universal 
and benevolent values because such framing has a tendency to attract more funds.  
When development actors take the responsibility to remedying the suffering or unjust situation for 
a population in need, such actors have a responsibility to reflect on which outcomes can be 
foreseen from a given campaign. This would require them to reflect on their shortcomings in 
general and on their epistemic character and stereotypical prejudice.  
If we make such investigations thoroughly, we can avoid some of the implications Invisible 
Children has in its campaigning, as this would require us to make a thorough epistemic 
investigation of the given situation thus to be epistemically trustworthy and respect the agency of 
the population whom we have remedial responsibility to help. If we, in spite of our best efforts, still 
detect that our actions in a given development campaign inflict more harm than good to the 
beneficiaries, then, we it would be our remedial responsibility to stop the actions and redirect them 
because is it worse to directly inflict harm than to fail to prevent it. 
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